LABOR UNIONS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS*
BENARD D. MELTZER t
HE NATIONAL POLICY in favor of competition, reflected in the anti-

trust laws, is designed to promote economic efficiency, consumer
welfare, and a system of diffused power.' The national labor
policy fosters, or at least tolerates, large-scale labor organization despite
its capacity to interfere with those economic and noneconomic objectives
of the antitrust laws. Accommodation of these conflicting policies, or
the subordination of one policy to the other, has, for some time, been a
troublesome and unruly issue.
A perennial response to that conflict calls for the application of the
antitrust laws to union activities. That proposal has had deep and
powerful roots: fear of the anticompetitive consequences and the inefficiencies attributed to unions;2 concern that the size and centralization of union structures obstruct the noneconomic objectives of unions

and particularly the achievement of union democracy; 3 hostility to the
union movement and its dynamic drive for an increased role in industrial
decision making; and the conviction that the substantial immunity of
unions from regulation applicable to their management adversaries reflects a more pervasive one-sidedness in labor-management regulation.
One purpose of this article is to consider the proposal that antitrust
* This article is one of a collection which deals with various aspects of labor relations and which was prepared by members of the University of Chicago and the
Harvard Business School faculties. The entire collection of articles is being published
in Volume 6 of the Journal of Law & Economics. The editors of the Review are
grateful to that journal for consenting to the publication of this article here.
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1 See the well-known statement by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945): "It is possible, because of its
indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for
his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those
engaged must accept the direction of a few."
2 See, e.g., LINDBLOM, UNIONS AND CAPFFALIsm 5 (1949), critically reviewed by Rees,
Labor Unions and the Price System, 58 J. POL. EcON. 254 (1950). But see Lester,
Reflections on the "LaborMonopoly" Issue, 55 J. PoL. ECON. 513, 519 (1947), emphasizing union-induced efficiendes. See also Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J.
POL. ECON. 1 (1944), reprinted in SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCLETY 121

(1948).
3 See generally Lester, supra note 2, at 519; Magrath, Democracy in Overalls: The
Futile Quest for Union Democracy, 12 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 503 (1959).
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coverage be extended to unions.4 That task is complicated by the obscurity of that suggestion. Its terms do not indicate the activities that
it would reach; its proponents do not add such specification or indicate
the relevance of that proposal to the general problem of union monopoly;5 nor do they expressly take account of the fact that some union
activities once condemned under the Sherman Act have been proscribed
by labor legislation.
A convenient point of departure for the assessment of that proposal
is a review of the role that the Sherman Act once played, and still plays,
in the regulation of union activities. Such a review, to be undertaken
here, has been made timely by the revival of old issues and the emergence
of new ones in recent litigation. 6 That litigation may justify a reexamination of the problems raised by the clash of national policies despite
7
the pages of scholarship that have been devoted to them.
4 Bills introduced since 1945 that incorporate, or are related to, the antitrust
proposal may be categorized as follows: (1) those proscribing combinations, etc. in restraint of trade by unions or amending the Clayton Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act
so as to eliminate any antitrust exemption; see, e.g., S. 1656, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945);
H.R. 2182, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. 389, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R.'2437,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); (2) those proscribing collusion between labor unions and
employers with respect to wage determination or restricting a union to representing the
employees of a single employer or a specified number of employees within a single
metropolitan area; see H.R. 7697, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. 8449, 82d Cong., 2d
Seas. (1952); H.R. 333, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); cf. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 9(f)(1) (1947) (prohibiting National Labor Relations Board certification of multiemployer units and certification of the same union as the representative of employees
of competing employers unless certain rigorous conditions were met. The Ball amendment would have banned certification of a multiemployer unit unless the employees
were in the same metropolitan district or county; it was defeated by one vote. 93 CONG.
REC. 4442, 4674, 4676 (1947)); (3) those proscribing particular practices such as "featherbedding," price fixing and other restraints on sales of products or services by a firm;
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 2931, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 333,
88th Cong., 1st Seas. (1963); (4) those aimed at union combinations or restrictive practices in particular industries, such as transportation; see, e.g., S. 2573, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961); (5) those calling for study of the advisability of subjecting unions to the
antitrust laws; H.R. Con. Res. 20, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). A single bill may fall in
more than one category.
5 "Union monopoly" here is used as a tool of analysis and not as a standard of
evaluation; the phrase refers to a union's power by virtue of its control over the labor
force of a firm or an industry to increase wage costs over those that would prevail in the
absence of collective action. See generally CHAMBERLIN, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOR
POwER (rev. ed. 1963); MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM
196-216 (1957). For various meanings of "labor monopoly," see Lester, supra note 2, at
520. If a substantial number of firms serving a particular product market is not
organized, the power of a union in the organized sector is severely limited by competitive pressures. Hence, the classic objective of unions has been "to take competition out
of wages" by organizing all or substantially all firms producing for a common market.
6 See text accompanying notes 117-154 infra.
7 An extensive list of earlier writings is set forth in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW, 145 F.2d 215, 221 nA (2d Cir. 1944). See also BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN
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That examination will suggest the unlikelihood that a substantial
check on "excessive" union power would be provided either by the revival of the Sherman Act as a curb on union activities or by related proposals designed to insulate product markets against restraints directly
imposed by collective bargaining. Accordingly, brief consideration will
also be given to more drastic proposals for limiting union power by
confining the bargaining jurisdiction of particular unions.
Such a review should ideally be preceded by an examination of the
sources of union power, an identification of unions that have accumulated large powers, and an effort to assess the impact of union power on
the broad range of interests affected by its exercise. That formidable
examination will, however, not be undertaken here.8 This paper will
assume that union power in some contexts poses substantial obstacles
to effective performance of the economic system 9 and to equitable distribution'0 and will consider the utility of an antitrust approach as a
remedy for the difficulties involved.
I
Even before labor unions enjoyed a sweeping exemption from the
Sherman Act, that act, as applied by the Supreme Court," was not
Acr (1930). Among the valuable recent discussions are Cox, Labor and the Antitrust
Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Hildebrand, Collective
Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, in PUBLIC POLICY AND COLLwVE BARGAINING 152
(Shister ed. 1962); Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor-the Antitrust Laws and Allen
Bradley, 13 LAB. L.J. 957 (1962); and Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition,
73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963).
8 See generally Meltzer, Symposium on Labor Union Power and the Public InterestSome Introductory Observations, 35 NoTRE DAME LAW. 595 (1960), and the references
cited therein. The other articles in the Journal of Law & Economics' collection on
various aspects of labor relations, although not intended to be a systematic confrontation of the central issues, will illuminate some of them.
9 The annual cost of "featherbedding" has been estimated at $2,000,000,000; that
estimate rests on the Wall Street Journal. See LErER, F ATHERBEDDING AND JOB SECURrrY
67 (1964).
10 See RERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 194 (1962); Rees, The Effects of
Unions on Resource Allocation, to appear in 6 J. L. & ECONOMICS.
11 In Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), the first Supreme Court case applying the
act to union activities, the Court emphasized the union's resort to secondary pressures
and not its objective of securing industry-wide organization. Id. at 294-95. See also
Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8- Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438-39 (1911), where the Court,
although condemning boycotts, recognized the legality of "powerful labor unions"; and
Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell, 202 Fed. 512 (N.D.W. Va. 1912), rev'd, 214 Fed. 685
(4th Cir. 1914), rev'd, 245 U.S. 229 (1917), where the Court, although sustaining the trial
court's injunction, with modifications, did not accept its view that the United Mine
Workers was an unlawful monopoly. The Court passed over that point, presumably
because only the government could maintain an injunctive action, prior to the passage
of the Clayton Act. For a discussion of the earlier cases, see BERMAN, op. Cit. supra
note 7, at 77-98; Winter, supra note 7, at 30-38.
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directed at the existence of union monopoly in the labor market or at
efforts by a union to achieve such monopoly by organizing substantially
all of the workers producing for a given market. The act was essentially
a proscription against bad practices, such as union-instigated boycotts
enforced either through consumers or through employees of secondary
employers. 12 In proscribing boycotts the Court had not explicitly attached any importance to union efforts to extend unionization, together
with the closed shop, over an entire industry. 13 Indeed, the Court appeared to have recognized the legality of industry-wide unions 14 even
before they had apparently been legitimized by section 6 of the Clayton
Act. 15 Nor did the Court explicitly concern itself with the quantitative
impact of particular boycotts on supply and price in interstate markets.
Like the boycott of a firm by employer-combinations, the union-sponsored boycott was unlawful so long as it was aimed at interstate trade.
The Court's treatment of strikes that obstructed the production of
goods for interstate shipment contrasted sharply with its condemnation
of boycotts which interfered with the sale of goods at their destination
rather than at their point of origin. Such strikes, even though accompanied by extensive and serious breaches of peace, generally did not fall
within the Sherman Act. That result obtained even though the union
knew that the obstructed output would have gone into interstate commerce and understood that reduction of nonunion supply was critical
for the preservation of union gains. So long as the union's primary objective was found to have been the resolution of a local labor controversy, strikes that interfered with the production of goods destined for
interstate commerce were held not to be a "direct," i.e., an unlawful,
restraint on such commerce. 16
12 In addition to the cases cited in note 11 supra, see Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443 (1921). The Supreme Court invoked those cases, among others, in condemning a
boycott of out-of-state goods designed to provide work for the employees involved
rather than to affect the labor relations of the boycotted manufacturers. See Painters
Dist. Council v. United States, 284 U.S. 582 (1931), affirming, 44 F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1930).
13 The dissent in Duplex, supra note 12, emphasized the extent of organization in the
industry involved and the threat posed to the unionized sector by unorganized firms.
In Bedford, supra note 12, the dissent also pointed to the extent of past organization

and the need for .unionization as a counterpoise to an association of employers accounting for 70% of the output. The Court's apparent indifference to such factors was highlightedby the attention accorded to them in dissenting opinions. See Duplex, supra
note 12, at 479-83, and Bedford, supra note 12, at 59.

See cases cited note 11 supra.
Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
16 See United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924);
UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). The opinions in those cases emphasized
the narrow concept of interstate commerce that prevailed prior to 1937 and linked the
14

15 ,38

constitutional question with the existence of a specific intent to restrain trade, as dis-
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In Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW (Coronado 11)17 a unanimous Court
subjected the foregoing approach to an uncertain qualification ominous
for the development of national unions. Evidence in the second trial
had indicated that the capacity of the plaintiff-company had been substantially understated in the first trial and, more important, that the
union's strike and destruction of mining facilities had been prompted
by concern that nonunion competition, and particularly the plaintiff's,
would reduce the market for unionized coal and thereby undermine
the union's scale.' 8 That evidence was the basis for finding that the
union's paramount purpose had been to reduce the nonunion output
competing with union products in interstate commerce. The union's
overriding concern with interstate competition, as distinguished from
a "local" labor controversy, became the basis for the Court's characterization of the restraint on commerce as "direct" and for its condemnation
of the union's activities as a violation of the Sherman Act.
The Court's approach in Coronado II rested on a distinction between
local labor purposes and the purpose of sheltering union goods against
nonunion competition that was obviously unmanageable. Those purposes were not nicely separable, but coalesced, since local labor purposes
could be achieved only by protecting the local unionized sector against
the pressure of nonunion goods originating elsewhere. The Court implied, moreover, that a violation would be made out only by showing
that a union had expressed its concern that union goods might be displaced from interstate markets by nonunion goods. Sophisticated unions
could, thereafter, be expected to avoid such fatal explicitness; the Court's
doctrine was, accordingly, likely to reach only the unwary.
The consideration deemed decisive in Coronado II also suffered from
another basic flaw, its irrelevance to the general objectives of both the
Sherman Act and the union movement. Plainly, where unions by strikes
and related weapons reduced output destined for interstate markets,
the consequences for supply, price, and the union involved were in no
way affected by determinations as to whether the union's dominant purpose was to protect a local unionized sector or to reduce nonunion output destined for interstate commerce. Furthermore, whatever the union's
dominant purpose, preservation of benefits from organization in the
unionized sector was dependent on spreading unionization or on choking
off the flow of nonunion goods by the use of economic pressure.
tinguished from an intent to settle a local labor controversy. See 265 U.S. at 465 and 259
U.S. at 407-09.
17 Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). Justice Brandeis, who had dissented in the boycott cases, somewhat surprisingly joined in the Court's opinion.
18 See 268 U.S. at 295, 302; Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor, 8 U. CHI. L. Rxv.

222, 231 (1941).
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The proscription, in Coronado II, of such pressure on the ground that
the union had manifested that its purpose had been to avoid the erosion
of union standards through product competition plainly made legality
turn on elusive issues of intent and motive. A distinction so obviously
unmanageable and irrelevant to the preservation of a competitive order 19
could hardly be expected to survive. The uncertain shield for union
activities provided by that distinction might have been wholly withdrawn by imputing to union leaders knowledge that competition in the
product market threatened union gains and that such competition could
be moderated only by the extension of organization and of the union
scale. Such an approach, coupled with Coronado II, would have converted the Sherman Act into a barrier against the development of national unions, at least by the use of pressures that excluded nonunion
goods from interstate markets, and conceivably by requests for "voluntary" recognition directed at the same purpose. Later decisions, as we
will see in a moment, did not take that turn.
The Court's distinction between legal strikes and illegal boycotts was
as irrelevant to the preservation of competition as the approach in
Coronado II. That distinction depended on whether interstate commerce
was pinched at its origin or at its destination. That distinction clearly
could not be justified on the basis of any differential impact on the flow
of goods in interstate commerce. The effect on trade obviously was a
function of the effectiveness of the union pressure rather than the point
at which it was exerted. 20 Furthermore, strikes and boycotts were frequently alternative methods for achieving the same union objectives. A
boycott against a manufacturer was needed to advance a given objective
only when a strike did not succeed in stopping production. Where a
union had achieved sufficient control of an employer's work force, actual
and prospective, to mount an effective strike, there was no need for the
union to organize a boycott. Since such control of the work force is
the primary source of union power, the resort to boycotts to break a bargaining impasse was typically a sign of weakness rather than of strength.
As a consequence, the unfavorable treatment of boycotts, compared to
strikes, seemed perverse in relation to any general objective of limiting
private economic power.
To be sure, the boycott, then as now, appeared to have the vice of
expanding the area of conflict so as to involve third parties or "neutrals"
who could not directly resolve the underlying labor dispute. But such
neutrals could generally extricate themselves by exercising their option
to cut off their relations with the primary employer; that is, neutrals
19 See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 216 (2d rev. ed. 1958).

20 Id. at 212-13.
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could choose to bring about the situation that the union would have
achieved if it had possessed enough power to dose down the primary
employer by an effective strike. Such a strike would, of course, have deprived the primary employer of goods to sell and the possibility of profitable use of goods that he bought. Furthermore, an employer, prior to
the Wagner Act, could legally resort to a broad range of measures to
avert or to counter a strike. It was, therefore, not easy to see why boycotts by relatively weak unions should have triggered the severe sanctions of the Sherman Act while strikes and comprehensive lawlessness
directed at identical objectives and producing similar consequences on
interstate commerce were generally untouched by that act.
In developing the approach described above, the Court had emptied
the vague labor clauses of the Clayton Act of any significance. By ruling
that section 6 of that act did not exempt union departures from "normal
and legitimate objects,"2 1 the Court had preserved controversial and
uncertain judicial regulation of "union purposes." It had restricted the
application of section 20 to the parties to a dispute concerning their
own employment, present, past or prospective,2 2 thereby rendering that
section inapplicable to secondary activities initiated by immediate
parties but implemented by affiliated or sympathetic unions. Thus, notwithstanding the Clayton Act, classic weapons of organization2 3 and
collective bargaining remained subject to the Sherman Act.
The legislation of the thirties was, however, designed to promote the
use of those weapons and to curtail the role of the courts in the formulation of labor policy. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 24 enacted in

1932,

had drastically limited the issuance of injunctions in the federal courts.
In 1935 the Wagner Act2 5 had given moral approval and legal protection to organizational campaigns and to a broad range of concerted
activities by employees. But that legislation had not integrated the new
freedoms with the old restrictions; indeed, the new statutes had not
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
Id. at 472.
23 The boycott was, of course, an important organizing weapon, and the organizing
boycott gave rise to celebrated antitrust cases. See cases cited notes 11 & 12, supra.
Unions using boycotts for organizing purposes, rather than for resolving a bargaining
deadlock, are not necessarily "weak" in the areas they have already organized. Thus,
for example, the boycott has been an important lever for the Teamsters' organization
not only of truckers but also of warehousing and other nontrucking enterprises. See
James & James, Hofla's Acquisition of Industrial Power, 2 Ind. Rel., May 1963, p. 67,
at 76. Organizational boycotts and hot cargo provisions are now regulated by amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.
24 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 US.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1958).
21

22

25 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (amended by 73 Stat.
542 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964)).
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even mentioned the Sherman Act and, hence, had not eliminated the
threat of criminal and treble-damage actions based on the characterization of boycotts or organizational efforts as "direct" attacks on interstate commerce.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,26 decided in 1940, was the first step towards reducing the risks of such liability and of harmonizing the antitrust laws with the freedom granted unions by labor legislation. Apex
did not, however, purport to grant unions any special exemption from
the antitrust laws; it presumably would be the point of departure if
proposals to subject unions to the Sherman Act were adopted. Apex
remains, moreover, relevant in the ill-defined area of union activities
27
still subject to the Sherman Act under the Allen Bradley doctrine.
Hence, Apex merits special attention.
After organizing a handful of employees from the 2,500 employed by
a Philadelphia manufacturer, the American Federation of Hosiery
Workers demanded, but was denied, a closed shop. Thereupon, the
union stopped production and occupied the plant; the stoppage continued for about three months. In addition, the union refused to permit
the shipment of existing goods to out-of-state customers. The company
received a treble-damage award, based on the finding that the union
had violated the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court reversed that finding. The Court, dismissing the
union's violence as irrelevant, announced that the act did not apply to
strikes or other obstructions to interstate commerce unless they had an
effect, or were intended to have an effect, on prices. 28 Since the union's
only purpose had been organization and since no effect on prices had
been shown, the Court held the Sherman Act inapplicable.
The opinion emphasized that the elimination of nonunion competition was indispensable for effective union action, was wholly compatible
with the Sherman Act and, in any event, was privileged by section 6
of the Clayton Act.29 It followed that industry-wide or market-wide
unionization, whatever its effect on product competition or prices, was
privileged. Furthermore, since strikes were the traditional means for
achieving benefits from organization, the Apex opinion implied that
strikes, at least for conventional objectives, such as higher wages, were
lawful without regard to their impact on price and competition in the
product market.
That implication was, however, muddied because the Court, in
26
27

310 U.S. 469, affirming, 108 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1940).
See Part II herein.

28 310

29

U.S. at

501.

Id. at 503-04.
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disposing of the specific controversy before it, emphasized that the
union's obstructions to interstate commerce had not affected price and
had not been so intended. 30 The threat of this reservation was underscored by the Court's continued reliance on Coronado 11,31 despite the
tension between that case and earlier passages of the opinion. Also left
open was the possibility that a strike, or other obstructions to commerce,
which eliminated enough output to affect price, fell within the statutory
ban. But to apply the Sherman Act to such strikes would have been
contrary to both the basic premises behind labor legislation and the
dominant thrust of the Apex opinion. Such an application would have
converted the Sherman Act into an antistrike weapon protecting only
larger enterprises, since the elimination of their output, or indeed their
unionization under strike pressure, might have affected the price of
goods. But one of the declared objectives of the labor statutes was the
protection of labor organization in order to balance the power of large
business combinations. Plainly, strike protection confined to large enterprises would have been a perverse response to that objective. Furthermore, industry-wide unionization sanctioned by the Court could scarcely
have achieved labor's purposes in the labor market without strikes that
might have affected price by withdrawing a substantial volume of output for substantial periods. Those considerations suggested that the
Court's emphasis, in Apex, on the absence of price effects, was a convenient ad hoc expedient rather than a formulation of a general principle
condemning union activity producing such effects. That conclusion was,
moreover, reinforced by language throughout the opinion implying that
32
the statute was directed solely at business combinations and trusts.

Although Apex thus seemed to foreshadow substantial union emancipation from the Sherman Act, it did not, as already noted, articulate
an exemption for unions. The Court declared that the act would continue to apply to union activities that affected or restrained "commercial competition." 33 But the illustrations of restraints on such competition, drawn as they were from cases involving business combinations, 34
provided scant guidance as to whether and how the act should be ap30 Id. at 501-02. But if Apex had produced, e.g., 40% of the output in the industry
involved, that conclusion would have been vulnerable. Hence, Apex raised a question
about the legality of an organizational strike when it counted most. See Cavers, Labor
v. The Sherman Act, 8 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 246, 249 (1941).
31 See 310 U.S. at 511, 512, where the Court assimilated Coronado II to the secondary
boycott cases. But those cases had not emphasized the impact on prices or markets, and

it was difficult to see a basis for distinguishing the boycott cases from the obstruction
to interstate shipment in Apex. See Gregory, supra note 18, at 222, 226, 228, 232.
32 See 310 U.S. at 492, 493 n.15, 494, 497.
33 Id. at 495.
34 Id. at 497-98.
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plied to a variety of controversial union activities, such as secondary
3
boycotts, restraints on the use of new technology or of new products,

5

the exclusion of certain enterprises, whether or not unionized, from
particular markets, or the restriction of supply through control of hours
of work. Even if Apex is read as immunizing union restraints on the
labor market but not the product market, the line between those two
markets is, as the foregoing list suggests, not easily drawn. That difficulty aside, the impact of wage costs on supply and price results in an
inextricable connection between the two markets. As a result, the general objectives of the Sherman Act, consumer protection and the dispersion of private economic power, can be frustrated by monopoly power
exerted solely in the labor market. It is the risk of such frustration that
may have accounted for the confusing ambivalence of Apex and that
today still poses a formidable issue of national policy.
In 1941 the Court, in the celebrated case of United States v. Hutcheson,38 changed its course and substantially, although not completely,
resolved that ambivalence. Interlacing section 20 of the Clayton Act with
section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court ruled that those
two statutes made the Sherman Act inapplicable to the "practices spedfically enumerated" in section 20,37 at least if they occurred in the course
of a labor dispute. 38 As a consequence, peaceful strikes and boycotts,
which had been covered by section 20, were generally excluded from
the Sherman Act. The Court indicated both the breadth of that exclusion and its possible qualification in the future by declaring:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups,3 9 the licit and the illicit under § 20 are
not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or
unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities
40
are the means.
Despite the Court's controversial method in Hutcheson, its result
seemed sound. The Court, as we have seen, had not applied the Sherman
35 Compare Cavers, supra note 30, at 255 with Cox, supra note 7, at 273-75.
36 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); for an extensive list of com-

mentaries on this case, see Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 145 F.2d 215, 221 n.4
(2d. Cir. 1944).
37 312 U.S. at 230; see also Frankfurter, J., dissenting in United Bhd. of Carpenters
v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 413-14 (1947).
38 See Nathanson & Wirtz, The Hutcheson Case: Another View, 36 ILL. L. REv. 41,
47-51 (1941).
39 312 U.S. at 232 n.3. Here the Court inserted the following footnote: "Cf. United
States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549, involving a conspiracy of mill work manufacturers, building contractors and union carpenters."
40 Id. at 232.

LABOR UNIONS AND ANTITRUST

Act to preserve competition in labor markets. Nor had it developed a
principle for distinguishing between permissible and proscribed union
activities. The act, moreover, did not supply any criteria for policing
the objectives or methods of unions seeking to expand their jurisdiction
or to get better bargains for employees. Nor did it suggest how restrictions on unions, drawn from the act or elsewhere, were to be integrated
with the protections and freedoms, including the freedom to secure
market-wide organization, apparently accorded by the labor statutes.
Hutcheson virtually swept such problems aside by rendering the act
generally inapplicable to union efforts to achieve, to maintain, or to
exploit monopoly in the labor market. What remained for the Court
was further elucidation of the problem adumbrated in Hutcheson-the
treatment of union-employer combinations that achieved price restraints,
production allocation or other market-control schemes, proscribed for
employers acting without labor unions.
Hutcheson ended the controversial effort of the Antitrust Division,
under Thurman Arnold, to use the Sherman Act as a weapon against
union "bad practices." Subsequently, Congress, by amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), regulated such practices and
proscribed conduct such as secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes 41 that prior to Hutcheson had been condemned or attacked under
the Sherman Act.
The proposal for eliminating labor's exemption may well reflect dissatisfaction with the coverage or administration of those amendments.
But the proposal does not identify the defects in the existing law that
it would remedy. Its adoption could involve either an essentially redundant overlap with some of the existing prohibitions or an uncharted
reconstruction of existing regulation. Such a reconstruction might, for
example, seek to apply the doctrine of United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America42 so as to fragment unions on the ground that their absolute
size, coupled with predatory or unlawful practices, required corrective
action. So opaque a proposal in a complex and controversial field plainly
does not provide a basis for responsible legislative judgment. 43 On the
41 See National Labor Relations Act § 8, amended by, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3)-(f) (1964).
42 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The
absence of criteria for judicial regulation of union activities, on the basis of Aluminum,
is aggravated by the recognition that unions are designed to take "wages out of competition" throughout an entire market.
43 Cf. the remarks of the late Senator Taft: "You would practically have to write an
antitrust law for labor, because I do not think the Sherman Act is really aimed at it, or
that the wording is particularly suitable. It seems to me that if you do that you are
going to have to write an antitrust law saying that labor unions can only combine and
consult with each other and agree under certain limited conditions--those in the same
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contrary, it involves a legislative abdication scarcely compatible with the
respective responsibilities of the Congress and the courts for fundamental
policy making.
II
In Allen Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW,44 the Court was faced with the
issue reserved in Hutcheson-the status under the Sherman Act of market
arrangements arising from collaboration of unions and employer groups.
A somewhat detailed statement of the origin and evolution of the arrangements in question is necessary for an understanding of the dilemma
45
they posed and the Court's unsatisfying response.
By 1934 Local 3, by conventional organizing pressures, had obtained
dosed shop agreements from most of the electrical contractors in New
York City. The local, whose membership had declined during the depression, then turned to the organization of the New York manufacturers of electrical equipment. Sweetening conventional pressures by
promising to provide a sheltered market for those manufacturers, the
local secured dosed shop agreements from them as well as agreements
that they would confine their New York sales to contractors under contract with the local. The protected market was provided through agreements with the electrical contractors requiring them to buy certain components only from New York manufacturers under contract with the
local. By 1936 outside manufacturers, who had previously supplied most
of the electrical equipment to the New York contractors, had been
ousted from that market insofar as local products were available.
Insulated against outside competition, the local manufacturers raised
their prices. The higher prices were presumably made more palatable
to the contractors by union-induced restrictions on their competitive
bidding. Although the union had been the "actuating party"40 for
the arrangements for market and price control, their implementation in time involved the active participation of the employers,
area or those in the same company, dealing with the same company, or perhaps some

other exceptions, but that beyond that it is a violation of the antitrust law and can be
directly enjoined. It seems to me you have got to get to that." Hearings before Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Part IV, at 1793 (1947).
325 U.S. 797 (1945).
Although the Court did not disturb the findings below, id. at 798, its treatment
of the facts glossed over the initiative and the power exerted by the local in order to
develop market controls. For that reason, the statement in the text draws on the trial
court's reports. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 41 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(Master's Report), 51 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd, 145 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.), revrd,
44
45

325 U.S. 797 (1944).
46

41 F. Supp. at 750.
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acting through their associations. All three groups benefited: the union
and its members, through higher wages and lower hours; and the local
firms, through higher prices and profits. The obvious victims of the
restrictive arrangements were, as the courts observed, first, the excluded
outside manufacturers (and their employees), 47 and second, the public,
taxed by monopoly prices. Another group of victims consisted, presumably, of those workers who might have been employed in New York
electrical contracting had output not been lowered by monopoly prices.
The excluded manufacturers, in an action to enjoin the local's activities as a violation of the Sherman Act, named only Local 3 (and its
officers) as defendants. 48 The Supreme Court, although it upheld the
trial court's findings of such a violation, acknowledged that the local had
been acting in the interests of its members.4 9 The Court also indicated
that the union might have lawfully achieved the same market consequences by using conventional economic pressures to secure parallel
agreements with individual contractors and manufacturers restricting
their purchases and sales. 50 Indeed, the Court at one stage properly read
the record as showing an initial resort to such weapons by the union.51
Nevertheless, the Court found a violation by the local for two interdependent reasons: (I) the union had not been "acting alone" but "in
combination with business groups"; (2) the industry-wide understandings
had looked to and had achieved price and market control. 52 Consequently, the businessmen had engaged in activities condemned by the
Sherman Act. The union's participation did not immunize the businessmen and was itself a violation of the act.
The Court's distinction between parallel agreements and multiemployer agreements, directed at the exclusion of the outside manufac47 Some of those employees were covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated by other unions, including other locals of the IBEW. Local 3's jurisdiction extended only to the New York metropolitan area. See 325 U.S. at 799. The trial court
explicitly found that the local's activities had not been designed to affect wages or employment relations among the excluded manufacturers. See Finding #368 of Final
Decree and Declaratory Judgment incorporated in transcript filed in the Supreme
Court. Record, p. 285, Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1944).
48 The nonjoinder of the New York firms may have resulted from the filing of the
action prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hutcheson. In addition, the plaintiffs
may have considered the union to have been the "actuating party" and may also have
sought to avoid alienating potential purchasers.
49 325 U.S. at 798, 799.
50 Id. at 799, 807, 810. The opinion of the court of appeals, after remand, explicitly
directed that the injunction should be inapplicable if the union did not act in combination with nonlabor groups. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW,
164 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1947).
51 325 U.S. at 799.
52 Id. at 799, 800.
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turers, was vulnerable on several grounds. Obviously, that distinction was
of no practical significance to the iriterests at stake. Furthermore, the
Court's condemnation of market control because it was associated with
multiemployer bargaining ignored that such bargaining had been placed
on the same footing as individual bargaining by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 53 -an important factor in the Hutcheson immunity. On the other
hand, the Court's dictum on the legality of parallel agreements ran
counter to the approach to concerted activity that had been applied to
firms charged with antitrust violations. That approach would have permitted a finding of implied conspiracy by the business firms if they had
entered into individual agreements with knowledge that parallel action
by others was contemplated and was necessary for the success of the
restrictive program. 54 Surely, as suggested by Mr. Justice Roberts' concurring opinion in Allen Bradley,55 the hypothetical parallel agreements
could have served as a basis for finding an unlawful conspiracy by the
firms. And once such a finding had been made, the union's participation,
under the Court's rationale in Allen Bradley, would not have saved
either the firms or the union from the Sherman Act.
The Court, it should be noted, had emphasized that the business
groups in Allen Bradley had gone beyond the boycotting of "nonunion"
suppliers and customers and had engaged in direct price fixing.56 Unlike boycotts, such price fixing could not have been defended as classic
make-work and organizing devices. But if price fixing had been the
source of illegality, the ultimate remedy should have been confined, as
it was not, to eliminating that evil. Furthermore, the Court's opinion
intimated that even price fixing might have been tolerated provided
that it had been achieved by parallel, rather than multiemployer, agreements; 57 it could, after all, have been rationalized as a means of protecting individual employees from the instability of employment asso53 See §§ 4 and 13, 47 Stat. 70, 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 113 (1958). Section 20 of
the Clayton Act also implied that employers were to enjoy rights to concerted action
parallel to those of employees. Although § 6 of the Clayton Act did not expressly
mention employer associations, the pertinent legislative history reinforces the foregoing
implication. See 51 CONG. REc. 14333-34, 14336 (1914). In Allen Bradley the Court,
conceding that the means used by the union fell within § 20 and that a "labor dispute"
had been involved, rested the inapplicability of the Hutcheson immunity on the
presence of the union-contractor-manufacturer combination. See 325 U.S. at 807. That
result plainly was incompatible with the statutory exegesis in Hutcheson.
54 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939). Cf. Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 846 U.S. 537 (1954). For a discussion
of the uncertainties of "conscious parallelism" in cases involving business monopoly,
see Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 1964. 63 MICH. L. REv. 59, 85-88 (1964).
55 325 U.S. at 818-19.
56 Id. at 799-800.
57 Id. at 807-08.
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ciated with competition. Price fixing could also have been rationalized
as one of the interrelated inducements and pressures by which the union
first extended its jurisdiction to the manufacturing employees and then
promoted stable employment for both groups of employees. Accordingly,
from the union's point of view, there was no basis for distinguishing between the exclusion of outside manufacturers from the market and price
fixing by the contractors. 58
Nor were the Allen Bradley arrangements essentially different from
the exercise of the union's power over the labor market in their impact
on the interest of the special wards of the Sherman Act, those buying
goods and services from the electrical contractors. In this connection
it should be noted that the union's leverage was based on its control over
the contractors' labor force and on its capacity to prevent substantial
nonunion competition. The local's power, found by the trial court to
have been overwhelming, 59 could have resulted in the same degree of
exploitation of consumers even if it had been exercised solely in the
labor market. Indeed, it seems likely that to the extent that the union
by market control schemes permitted the firms to share in the monopoly
gains, it did so at the expense of its own constituents employed by the
electrical contractors. Those employees presumably would have received
more had the union exercised its power to maximize their wages while
leaving the firms subject to price competition. The union may have
rejected that course on the questionable assumption that a monopolistic
seller is better off if he, first, provides monopoly profits for those to whom
he sells and then gets part of such profits back. 60 The union may also
have considered that a division of the spoils from its monopoly position
was a justifiable price to pay for achieving other ends, such as extending
its jurisdiction to the manufacturing sector, maintaining peaceful relations with both sets of firms, or stabilizing employment opportunities
provided by the contractors. In speculating as to what Local 3 was trying
to maximize, it is worth noting that the findings of the trial court im58 See MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 199 (1957):
"If the labor market embraces that group of economic activities which a union may
seek to influence in its attempt to increase its power to improve wages, hours, and
working conditions, there is really no tenable distinction between labor markets and
product markets. There is literally no entrepreneurial activity in the production and
sale of goods that cannot conceivably be influenced by union activities to the advantage
of union members."
59 See 41 F. Supp. at 730-31, 740-48, 749.
60 The assumption that a union that has achieved control over the labor market will
do better if it restricts competition in the product market is related to the view that
unions do better in bargaining with monopolistic or oligopolistic, as distinguished from
competitive, firms. For a discussion questioning that view, see R, s, THE EcoNoMics OF
TaRAn UNIONS 82-87 (1962).
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pliedly negatived any payoffs to the union officials for their enforcement
61
of market restrictions.
As for the New York firms, the benefits accruing to them from the
market control arrangements seemed on the surface quite different from
the typical impact of union activities. The firms' profits, after all, increased because of, not in spite of, the arrangements sponsored by Local
3. Such a result plainly runs counter to the conventional view of collective bargaining as a war between labor and management. But antagonism between labor and management within a firm is replaced by
a common interest in the face of pressures from nonunion competition.
Since elimination of such competition tends to avoid the erosion of
union gains and to preserve the markets and profitability of the unionized firm, there are, from the firms' standpoint, similarities between a
union's control of the labor market of competitors and the anticompetitive effects of the market controls imposed in Allen Bradley.
Even the plaintiff-manufacturers in Allen Bradley were not in any
essentially different position from other firms that had been blocked
from markets by labor's pressures, without being accorded a remedy
under the Sherman Act. For example, prior to Allen Bradley the Court
had held that the act did not bar unions from seeking to preserve jobs
by barring the use of new technology. 62 Plainly, producers of such
technology, to the extent that they had been denied markets by such
pressures, were in a position similar to that of the outside manufacturers in A llen Bradley.
The difficulties that dominated the Allen Bradley opinion were the
result, as the Court suggested, of a basic collision between the policy of
preserving competition in product markets and the policy of fostering
or tolerating labor monopolies. 63 Under Hutcheson and the legislation
of the thirties the classic objectives of a competitive order-consumer
protection, access to markets, and efficient use of resources-had been
subordinated to labor's pursuit of its self-interest. It was not easy to see
why that freedom should have been judicially limited merely because
labor's impact on the product market was direct rather than indirect,
61 See 145 F.2d at 220. See also id. at 224-25 n.10, referring to the suggestions in
Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act (pts. 1-2), 29 VA. L. Rv. 272, 395 (19421943), that when union power is used for the benefit of monopolistic nonlabor groups,
the union officers, and not the union, should be liable, a result that is supported by
§ 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1958).
62 See United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 318 U.S. 741 (1943), affirming,
47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942); United States v. Building & Constr. Trades Council
(Hod Carrier's Case), 313 U.S. 539, affirming, United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191
(N.D. Ill. 1941). But cf. Painters' Dist. Council v. United States, 284 U.S. 582 (1931),
affirming, 44 F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1930).
63 325 U.S. at 803, 806.
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or because restraints on product competition were viewed as the cause
rather than the result of higher wages, or because labor's activities directly rather than indirectly provided a sheltered market to a group of
employers. 4 Nevertheless, such freedom to unions to impose direct
restraints on product markets raised the threat of union-induced monopolization powered by the idea that unions by price fixing and other
restraints on the product market could increase profits and thereby
enable employers to raise wages. Such cooperative monopoly was wholly
incompatible with the purposes of the Sherman Act and scarcely could
be rationalized under the prevailing ideology of unionism.
That ideology emphasized the worker's inequality in relation to
capital, his need for a voice in the fixing of the terms and conditions of
his employment, and the role of the union as an offset to combination
and monopoly power on the enterprise side. Such considerations scarcely
could legitimize the use of union power to create monopoly profits for
industry by market rigging even though such profits were to be split
with labor.
In Allen Bradley the Court, pulled by conflicting national policies
and confronted with a sobering demonstration of union power, pretended
to find guidance in the "congressional purpose" of outlawing business
monopolies. 65 But that "guide" was fashioned by the Court rather than
Congress, for Congress had failed to indicate how the prohibition of
commercial restraints and the purposes underlying that prohibition were
to be integrated with the purpose of fostering unionization and collective
bargaining. It was presumably the lack of such guidance, coupled with
the distasteful character of the Allen Bradley restraints, that moved the
Court to minimize the union's dynamic role in the development of
those restraints. Thus, the Court emphasized the employers' market
restrictions,6 6 passed over the findings below that Local 3 had been the
actuating party, and transformed the employers into principals and the
local into their accessory 67-a transformation that was given an ironic
twist by the failure of the plaintiffs to join the New York employers
as defendants.
The Court's reshaping of the facts has contributed to uncertainties
over the reach of the Allen Bradley doctrine. One view is that the
doctrine is directed only at sham arrangements, i.e., those diverting
union power from legitimate union ends to the enforcement of em64 See 145 F.2d at 224-26.
65 325 U.S. at 811.
66 Id. at 810.
67 Id. at 807, 809, 811. The Court's approach drew fire from both Roberts, J., concurring, and Murphy, J., dissenting, on the ground that the union had been the
"dynamic force which has driven the employer group ... into agreements." Id. at 820.
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ployer restrictions on competitive markets. 68 But that view ignores both
the Court's explicit recognition that Local 3 had been seeking to benefit
its members and the undisturbed finding that corruption had not been
involved. Employee benefit will always be the paramount objective of
union leaders honestly serving their constituents. Union officials seeking
to benefit employers as an end in itself are obviously defaulting on their
fiduciary obligations and, presumably, are being paid off to do so. Surely
the extended exposition undertaken in Allen Bradley was not necessary
to exclude such sham and venal arrangements from the Hutcheson immunity. 69
A second and more expansive view of Allen Bradley is warrafited both
by the Court's language and the facts before it: the Sherman Act applies to union-employer combinations that institute market restrictions
essentially similar to those devised by businessmen even when they are
free from union pressure. Accordingly, such restrictions are not exempted
from the act on the ground that they were thrust on resistant employers
by a union pursuing its own interests by conferring monopoly benefits
on an employer combination.
The second interpretation would obviate some slippery questions
and disingenuous tactics spawned by such questions as the following:
Were employers active architects of market restrictions or unwilling
beneficiaries capitulating to union pressure? Have union officers been
paid off to impose such restraints for the purpose of benefiting employers? What was the relative magnitude of employer and union benefits? Did the benefits to employers exceed those necessary for the achievement of conventional union objectives? Such elusive questions are
plainly made irrelevant by a test which inquires only whether the
restraints on the marketing of goods and services were of a kind that
could have produced monopoly benefits for groups of employers 70 collaborating with a union. '
That test would, however, not reach a broad pattern of restraints on
the marketing of goods and services, such as union restrictions on purchases from firms outside of the union's jurisdiction or proscription of
labor-saving equipment, that are imposed in order to preserve jobs or
.wage standards within the unionized sector. Such restrictions, even when
they involve the collaboration of employer-groups, plainly do not provide
the participating employers with sheltered markets or monopoly bene68 See Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting
Policies, 110 U. PA. L. Rv. 1094, 1099 (1962).
69 See Albrecht v. Kinsella, 119 F.2d 1003, 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 1941), approved in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 145 F.2d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 1944).
70 The question of what kind of conduct is necessary to constitute "an employer
group" is briefly considered, at text accompanying note 170 infra.
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fits. On the contrary, the putative purchasers are presumably harmed by
the disruption of advantageous relations with respect to the goods that
they buy. But such boycotts do provide a sheltered market for the sellers
favored by the union and, correspondingly, exclude the boycotted sellers
from that market. The latter group of sellers would, as already suggested, be in substantially the same position as the outside electrical
manufacturers in Allen Bradley. It is not, however, clear whether Allen
Bradley was to apply to such boycotts. Such an application gains some
support from the Court's recognition that many union activities restrain
trade and from its suggestion that the legality of such restraints depends
on "whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups."'71 But the Court's larger concern was with the power of business
groups "to shift our society from a competitive to a monopolistic economy," 72 and the Court expressed that concern in a context where the
participating firms had shared in the spoils of monopoly. Where, however, employers accede to union demands to limit competition, not
among themselves, but among their suppliers, the participating employers enjoy none of the benefits of monopoly and have every incentive to resist the union demands. Accordingly, the restriction on competitive markets imposed by such boycotts arises not from the appeal
of monopoly gains to the participating employers but solely from the
power behind the union demands. The absence of such gains means at
least that employer self-interest will serve as a check on such union-sponsored restraints on product competition.
It should, however, be noted that the dissent by four Justices in Hunt
v. Crumboch,7 3 decided the same day as Allen Bradley, was incompatible with an approach giving decisive effect to employer benefit and
that the majority opinion in Crumboch was not clear-cut on that point.7 4
The decision in that case underscored the uncertainties of the Court's
See 325 U.S. at 810.
Ibid.
73 325 U.S. 821 (1945). In that case, after a strike, the union secured an agreement
restricting the A & P to contract haulers with union shop agreements. The union
rejected the offer by the plaintiff, a contract hauler, to enter into such an agreement
and induced first A & P and, later, another firm to cancel contracts with the plaintiff,
thereby excluding the plaintiff from business. That exclusion had apparently been
prompted by the plaintiff's operations during the strike, which had been attended by
violence and the death of a union member; a partner in plaintiff's firm had been
acquitted of the homicide.
74 Although the majority might have relied on the absence of benefit to the boycotting employers, it urged that there had not been any combination of the plaintiff's
competitors but only of workers refusing to sell their labor. 325 U.S. at 824. It is not
clear from that argument whether the decisive factor was the absence of anything more
than parallel agreements by the boycotting firms or the absence of monopoly benefits
to them since they were not in competition with the plaintiff.
71

72
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approach-uncertainties that fundamentally arise from the absence of
a principle for harmonizing the conflict between the policy of commercial competition and of collective bargaining.
The uncertainties of Allen Bradley have not been markedly clarified
by subsequent developments. The Supreme Court has not reconsidered
the issues involved, and the decisions of lower courts often have not
articulated a general rationale. 75 In examining those decisions, it is
useful to distinguish among three types of restraints: (1) limitations on
competition in the sales of final products of employer groups of a kind
that could provide monopolistic benefits to some or all of the employers collaborating with unions; (2) restrictions on the choice of firms
from which the participating employers may purchase goods or services
or to whom they may sell; 76 (3) activities relating to wages, hours,

or job-control, i.e., "labor market" activities, challenged on the ground
that their specific purpose or dominant effect was to eliminate certain
competitors of the participating employers or otherwise to restrict competition in the sales of the final product of such employers.
Restraints on FinalProduct Competition
Where unions in collaboration with employer groups have fixed prices,
allocated markets, or limited competition of the final product of the
participating employers, they have often been held liable under the
Sherman Act. Thus, liability has been imposed in the building trades
for bid pooling and contractor-designation schemes enforced by the
union's withholding of labor from recalcitrant or nonparticipating employers. 77 Similarly, union efforts to fix prices to be received by participating employers78 or otherwise to restrict price competition have been
75 See Bernhardt, supra note 68, at 1101.
76 See text accompanying notes 113-116 infra. Although restrictions on sales impinge
on the final product of the participating employers, they do not necessarily involve price
fixing, territorial allocation, or similar benefits accruing from monopolistic practices
that might be devised by employers, union pressure aside.
77 See Local 175, IBEW v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
917 (1955) (no discussion of who initiated scheme or of how monopoly spoils were
divided); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
78 See Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 72 F.
Supp. 562 (D.C. Hawaii 1947); cf. Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143
(1942). See also McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1956). Fishermen's unions
have been condemned for a variety of price-fixing arrangements. See Brickner, Labor
and Antitrust Action, 13 IND. & LAB. RE.L. REy. 245, 246-47 (1960). Their activities have
given rise to difficult problems because employee wages are sometimes a percentage of
the price received for the catch (see McHugh) or because some of the "employers" are
union members who work along with the crew and whose relationships with the purchaser raise questions as to whether the "employer"-fishermen should be characterized
as independent contractors (cf. Hawaiian Tuna Packers). Los Angeles Meat &
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condemned. 79 A violation has also been made out by allegations that an
agreement between a union and an association of construction subcontractors provided for union approval of would-be subcontractors, the
assignment of subcontractors to designated contractors, and the denial
of union workers to disapproved subcontractors.8 0
Restraints on competition imposed by union-employer combinations
on sales of the final product of participating employers have, however,
sometimes escaped condemnation on a variety of grounds. The decision
by the Federal Trade Commission in California Sportswear & Dress
Ass'n 8l illustrates this extension of immunity and merits attention because its elaborate exposition served only to underscore the uncertainties of the Allen Bradley doctrine.
California Sportswear involved two sets of restraints. First, competition among contractors was limited by the following means: (a)
requiring manufacturers and jobbers to use only contractors in contractual relations with the union; (b) a contractor-designation procedure
administered by the union; and (c) requiring prices paid to contractors
to be sufficient to meet their wage costs plus a reasonable amount for
Provisions Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962), discussed in text accompanying note 91 infra, will increase the uncertainties in this area.
79 See United States v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 153 F. Supp. 803, 808
(D. Minn. 1957), where the union, in order to protect drivers' commissions, sought to
prevent store sales of milk at "unfair prices," in combination with a group of dairies
and stores. The participation of the stores resulted in price effects on their final
product; the court's opinion implies, however, that a violation would have resulted even
though the price impact had resulted solely from union instigation of the dairies to
boycott the price-cutting stores. See also Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing
Photo-Engravers Ass'n of Philadelphia, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946). The plaintiff, in
order to service newspapers, employed photoengravers at night who, during the slack
periods, did commercial photoengraving. Plaintiff had a collective bargaining agreement that covered daytime photoengraving for newspapers but did not extend to nighttime commercial photoengraving. Defendant-association of commercial photoengravers,
concerned about insufficient business and plaintiff's low prices, objected to the union's
supplying nighttime workers to the plaintiff. The association's agreement with the union
prohibited future night work without the consent of both parties. On the basis of that
agreement and the association's objection, the union ordered its members to abstain
from further nighttime commercial work for the plaintiff. The employees, who had
previously voted against a strike, complied. At the same time, a firm owned by the
association's president, which did photoengraving for another newspaper, was permitted to do commercial work at night. The complaint was upheld on the ground that
the association had used the union to exclude the plaintiff from the commercial engraving field in order to restrict price competition and eliminate a competitor. It
should be noted that the union's pressure was not designed to prevent night work as
such, but only a particular kind of night work that had been opposed by plaintiff's
competitors because it had diverted business from them.
80 United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954), reversing, 118
F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
81 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957).
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overhead. The three employer groups involved, after first opposing
those clauses, had accepted them in substantially identical terms after
being pressed to do so by the union.8 2 The second set of restrictions
applied to all three employer groups and concerned their acquisition of
new ownership interests in women's sportswear firms. All members of
those groups were required to give the union advance notification of
acquisitions and were also restricted to acquisitions in the Los Angeles
area and among firms already in contractual relations with the union.
The first set of restrictions on the use of contractors was plainly
vulnerable on two grounds: it sheltered the contractors against any
competition from nonunion firms, and the price provisions limited
competition among unionized contractors. Those restrictions thus seemed
to have involved the possibility of benefit to one group of participating
employers essentially similar to that associated with market control by
any group of competitors. Indeed, those restrictions were markedly
similar to those developed, apparently without union assistance, by
an association of contractors and condemned by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n.83 In that case, the
Court, invoking Allen Bradley, had declared: "And if it [the union]
did [participate], benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a
cat's paw to pull employers' chestnuts out of the antitrust fires." 84
Nevertheless, the Commission in California Sportswear held Allen
Bradley inapplicable. It emphasized that the agreements had resulted
from union coercion, but then backtracked by adding that otherwise
impermissible arrangements embodied in collective bargaining agreements
would not be validated by union instigation and initial employer
resistance.8 5 The controlling considerations appeared to be whether
union participation had been "intended" solely for the union members'
benefit and whether competition had in fact been stifled. 6 The
Commission found no "substantial evidence in the record" that the contractor designation procedure had markedly affected competition. It
emphasized that there had been no prospect of direct gain to the jobbers
and manufacturers from such a procedure. It dismissed any gains to
the unionized contractors from the elimination of nonunion competition
and the regulation of their own competition as incidental to the union's
efforts to protect employment opportunities for its members. It also
dismissed the pricing provisions on the ground that there was no
82 Id.

at 844.

83 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
84 Id. at 464.

at 891.
at 893.

85 54 F.T.C.
86 Id.
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evidence that they had been designed to produce or had produced price
uniformity on the part of the contractors.
The Commission, in short, upheld restraints on competition that
appeared to run afoul of Allen Bradley on the ground that there had
been no showing that the participating employers had in fact realized
monopoly gains. Such a showing is, however, not required with respect
to similar restraints imposed by employers without union participation,
and the Commission failed to justify a different approach in the two
situations. To be sure, its opinion did emphasize the historic difficulties
that have been associated with the contracting-out system in the
garment trades. But such difficulties had been passed over in silence
by the Supreme Court in Women's Sportswear. The Commission emphasized also the need to give effect to the policy of the Taft-Hartley Act
in applying the Sherman Act.81 There was, however, nothing in the

labor statutes, prior to the 1959 amendments, 88 that would have
supported a limitation on the Allen Bradley rule.
The Commission's findings could not, however, change the fact that
an employer-union combination had agreed to arrangements whose direct effect would be to insulate the participating unionized firms
against nonunion competition and thereby to "benefit" them-at least
in the short run. If such arrangements had been enforced by the
employers without union participation, they would have violated the
act. The rejection of any violation in California Sportswear appeared
to rest primarily on the findings that the union was seeking to protect
only its members and not the employers and that the employers were
unwilling collaborators.89 The issue of legality was thus made to turn
on whether the employers were aiding the union in its market-control
scheme or vise versa. That approach, although it gains some support
from the Supreme Court's reading of the facts in Allen Bradley, 0 is
vulnerable to two criticisms. First, it is enormously difficult to administer
because of its dependence on ultimate and subjective purposes and on
the effects of restrictive arrangements on supply and price, which are
difficult of proof. Second, as indicated above, whenever union officers
are not venal, their agreements with employer combinations to establish a sheltered market are designed for the ultimate benefit of the
87 Id. at 889, 895.

88 The second proviso to § 8(e), added by 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp.
V, 1963), exempts the garment trades from prohibitions against securing hot cargo
agreements and securing or enforcing them by economic pressure. That proviso is, however, silent about antitrust exemption, and, in any event, does not purport to sanction
horizontal price fixing.
89 54 F.T.C. at 891.
90 See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
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employees. Indeed, the realization of impressive benefit to employees
did not operate in Allen Bradley to legalize the arrangements there
involved. To make intended or actual employee benefit the passport
to legality is wholly to ignore the value that Allen Bradley attached to
the elimination of union-employer restraints on competition in the
market for the employers' final product.
The language of the Supreme Court, although not its decision, in
Los Angeles Meat & Provisions Drivers Union v. United States,9 ' may
foreshadow an even more expansive privilege to union-business combinations to restrain trade in the employers' final product, at least where
businessmen-workers are involved. That case arose from the following
situation. Grease processors in the Los Angeles area procured waste
grease, by direct purchases from restaurants, etc., picked up by the
processors' own unionized employees and by purchases from "peddlers,"
who acted as intermediaries between various sources of supply and the
processors. After the peddlers had been unionized, the union fixed the
peddlers' purchase and selling prices, allocated accounts and territories,
eliminated recalcitrant peddlers by barring processors from buying from
them, and generally enforced its program by strikes and boycotts.
The union had stipulated that those practices had occurred, that they
had violated the Sherman Act, and that they could properly be enjoined.
It contested only the additional remedy imposed by the district court,
an order terminating the union membership of the "independent
businessmen."
In sustaining that order the Court 92 relied on Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton,93 which was plainly applicable, as a basis for
condemning the union's organization of a cartel that controlled the
marketing of the peddlers' final product. But the Court introduced
uncertainty about its approach by emphasizing that there had been
"no showing of any actual or potential wage or job competition, or of
any other economic interrelationship, between the grease peddlers and
the other members of the union." 94 It pointed to the finding below
that no such competition had existed, a finding based on a stipulation
that no processor had ever substituted peddlers for employee-drivers
or had theatened to do so.95 On the basis of that finding, which, we will
91 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
92 Id. at 102.
93 315 U.S. 143 (1942). (Act violated where a union comprised of fishermen and their
employees sought to bar nonunion competitors from the market by refusing to sell to
would-be purchasers unless they boycotted nonunion sellers.)
94

371 U.S. at 98.

95 Ibid.
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see,96 was plainly unreal, the Court concluded that the union had had

no legitimate interest in organizing the self-employed entrepreneurs;
consequently, the union's suppression of competition fell within the
Sherman Act and was not immunized by the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The reason for the Court's emphasis on the alleged lack of any
economic interrelationship between the peddlers and the processors'
employees is not wholly dear. That emphasis seemed to be related to the
Court's recognition that in some cases unions may legitimately organize
ostensibly independent contractors who are functionally employees.9 7 But
in such cases appropriate characterization would appear to depend on
the functional role of the disputed group and not solely on whether the
disputed group competes with individuals who are employees. Thus, the
Court's emphasis implies that if the missing economic interrelationship
between the two groups had been found to exist, it would have been
permissible for the union to cartellize the peddlers even though they
had properly been characterized as "independent contractors" rather
than employees.
96 See text accompanying notes 112-13 infra.

97 371 U.S. 103. The Court's supporting citations, introduced with a "Cf.", were:
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940);
Bakery 9: Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Local 24, Teamsters Union
v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). The cited cases, although they illustrate the conflict
between the interests of unionized employees and those of businessmen-workers performing similar economic functions, are somewhat remote. Thus, it should be noted
that the Court in Lake Valley intimated that the "vendors" were functionally "employees" and noted that they had been so characterized by the plaintiffs. See 311 U.S.
at 95, 98. Furthermore, later developments raise questions about the vitality of Lake
Valley, which was limited by Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 117 F.2d 310,
313 (9th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942). The Taft-Hartley amendments to
the NLRA were designed to limit the situations in which ostensible independent-contractor relationships were characterized as employment relationships. See § 2(3) of
National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958), amending 49
Stat. 450 (1935); House Comm. on Education and Labor, Labor-Management Relations
Act, 1947, H.R. Rep. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947); NLRB v. Steinberg, 182 F.2d
850 (5th Cir. 1950). Section 8(b)(4)(A), added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(A) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (Supp. V, 1963), reinforces
§ 2(3) by proscribing union pressures designed to force self-employed persons to join
unions. Even if courts in Sherman Act cases were bound to validate concerted activities
of businessmen-workers protected by the NLRA, as amended, there would be no
warrant in Sherman Act cases for expansion of the protection accorded by the NLRA.
It is true that in the Oliver case the Court, without passing on the independent-contractor question, invalidated the application of a state antitrust law to minimum rental
rates fixed by a collective bargaining agreement. But the Court carefully noted the
absence of any claim that federal law had been violated and made it clear that the
bargaining process was to be limited by federal standards. See 358 U.S. at 286. Finally,
the position in Lake Valley Farm that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred an injunction
against Sherman Act violations growing out of labor disputes (311 U.S. at 102-03) was
repudiated in Allen Bradley. Plainly, the Court's "Cf." carried quite a burden.

684

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:659

The basis for that position appears to be that businessmen-workers,
such as the peddlers, are directly substitutable for unionized employees
and, accordingly, that the organization of the businessmen is necessary
for preserving union standards applicable to employees.98 Furthermore,
unless such organization is permitted, unions would have an incentive to
prohibit unionized employers from dealing with the businessmen. Such
prohibitions, which could be assimilated to no-subcontracting clauses,
might be lawful under the NLRA,9 9 as amended, and would appear to
be lawful under the Sherman Act. An appealing argument could thus
be made for permitting unions to regulate the prices, hours, etc. of
businessmen who are directly substitutable for unionized employees
and who could be wholly excluded from dealing with unionized firms.
There are, however, weighty opposing considerations. Such unionization collides with the tradition of "encouraging self-employer economic
units as a counter-movement to what are deemed to be the dangers
inherent in excessive concentration of economic power."' 00 The TaftHartley Act, as already suggested,?01 responded to that tradition by
seeking to limit situations in which "independent, contractors" were
classified as "employees" and by proscribing union pressures designed
to force the self-employed into unions. To read the Sherman Act
to give a more expansive reach to "employees" than was provided for
by Taft-Hartley would be inconsistent with the purpose reflected in
the latter statute. Such a reading would, moreover, be paradoxical in
that it would disregard that the objective of the Sherman Act is to
limit concerted activities by businessmen, while the objective of TaftHartley is to protect concerted activities by "employees." Under such
circumstances it would be strange indeed to have a broader definition
102
of "employees" under the Sherman Act than under Taft-Hartley.
Furthermore, the interdiction of price fixing by businessmen-workers
would operate, albeit modestly, as a check on union power. Indeed, the
resultant check would not be essentially different from that provided
by large firms offering products or services that could be economically
98 See Note, Employee Bargaining Power Under the Norris-LaGuardiaAct: The
Independent ContractorProblem, 67 YALE L.J. 98, 102 (1957); cf. United States v. Fish
Smokers Trade Council, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 227, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
99 See text accompanying note 160 infra.
100 The quotation is from Frankfurter, J., in International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 475 (1950).
101 See note 97 supra.
102 CI. Taylor v. Local 7, Int'l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 222 F. Supp.
812, 820 (D. Md. 1963), supporting the applicability of the Taft-Hartley test under the
Sherman Act, but concluding, on the basis of "the common-law test," that the disputed
group were "employees," rather than independent contractors. As a result, the "pricefixing" for services and the boycotts involved were held not to violate the Sherman Act.
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substituted for unionized labor. Thus, the logical implication of the
argument for union cartellization of businessmen-workers is that the
union should be able to cartellize and fix prices of firms whose output
may erode union standards. Finally, cartellization of businessmenworkers may be designed to and may operate to provide monopoly
gains to businessmen rather than to protect the integrity of union
standards. Thus, if one began with the union's cartellization of the
grease peddlers, the unionization of the processors' employees or the
policies adopted in collective bargaining for those employees could serve
as a method for maintaining the cartellized rate of return for the businessmen. The choice between these two alternative explanations of the
union's policies would require additional evidence. Such evidence might
consist of data showing that the unionized employees of the processors
had derived substantial or slight benefit from the union rate; such a
showing would not be easy to make. Or the evidence might show that the
cartellization of the peddlers resulted in great gains to them, or to
union officials, or to union members flowing from their ties to the firms
involved. In short, it would be difficult to determine whether the market
restraints on the peddlers' final product were a means of protecting employees substitutable for the peddlers or whether it had more vulnerable
objectives, such as achievement of monopoly gains for the peddlerbusinessmen.
Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, in which Mr. Justice
Brennan joined, was silent about the possibility of such gains and
indicated that unionization of businessmen-workers was not to be limited
to situations where they were directly substitutable for unionized employees. Thus, Mr. Justice Goldberg stressed that the Court's result was
based on the absence of record evidence showing any legitimate labor
interest for the organization of the peddlers and was not based on the
absence of job and wage competition between the processors' employees
and the peddlers' 03-a point which, according to the Justice, had been
"erroneously considered crucial by the District Court. 1 04 Furthermore,
the Justice emphasized that the union by conceding the peddlers
were independent businessmen had waived the argument that, under the
NLRB's approach in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc.,10 5 the peddlers
103

See 371 U.S. at 103-05.

104

Id. at 105.

105 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The Hearst case had been repudiated by the Taft-Harfley
amendments to § 2(3) of the NLRA. See note 97 supra. Perhaps the Justice's point was
that a characterization of the peddlers as "employees" would have transformed what

appeared to be price fixing and territorial allocation into legitimate incidents of
collective bargaining. Douglas, J., dissenting, wrote as if the Hearst approach had been
untouched by later legislation. See 371 U.S. at 108-09.
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were employees. Finally, he pointed to the "egregious nature of the
conduct involved,"' 06 presumably referring to the use of union power to
favor processors owned by union members. 107 The recurring emphasis on
the special circumstances, as the Justice made explicit, was designed to
suggest that the union might well have been privileged to effect a combination of the peddlers "for the purpose of bettering [their] economic condidon."' 08 Despite its reference to the Hearst case, the concurring opinion
failed to indicate dearly whether such a privilege was conditioned on the
characterization of the peddlers as "employees" rather than independent
contractors. But to read such a condition into the concurrence would
make a shambles of it; for if the "peddlers" were properly classified as
"employees," no extended exposition would have been necessary either
to characterize their "price-fixing" as privileged "wage-fixing" or to
characterize the other restraints involved as constituting the "terms and
conditions' of employment.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent urged that the characterization of
the peddlers as independent contractors was not decisive. 109 He emphasized that small entrepreneurs may disorganize an industry and that
the employees of the processors and the peddlers were all "in the same
boat"; 110 presumably, the Justice was rejecting the finding below that
there had been no competition between those groups. The existence
of such competition was, in his view, significant for two reasons: First,
the impact of the peddlers' competition on the interest of the processors' employees was apparently an additional basis for the legitimacy
of the union's interest "in the conditions of the industry that increase
or reduce employment opportunities or increase or reduce labor's rewards.""' Second, the peddlers' need for organization on their own behalf
and to protect the processors' employees brought the controversy within
the Norris-LaGuardia Act's broad definition of a "labor dispute"-a
legal conclusion, indeed a jurisdictional determination, that devolved on
112
the Court despite any stipulations to the contrary.
Mr. Justice Douglas seems on sound ground in rejecting the finding
of no competition between the processors' employees and the peddlers.
Plainly, the availability of the peddlers as an alternative source of
grease limited the union's power to get more for the processors' em106 371
Id.
Id.
Id.

107
108
109
110

U.S. at 103.

at 106-07.
at 106.
at 110.

Id. at 111. But cf. the quotation from Frankfurter, J., text accompanying note

100 supra.
M1371 U.S. at Ill.
112 Id. at 112.
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ployees. Nor was such a limitation negated by the stipulation that the
processors had neither substituted peddlers for their own employees
nor threatened to do so. Even in the absence of actual or explicitly
threatened substitution, the availability of the peddlers, like the existence of any other substitute for the processors' employees, would have
influenced bargaining over their wages, etc. Furthermore, the relative
costs of the two methods of collecting unprocessed grease would presumably have determined the method by which the processors secured
any increased requirements. Hence, the Court's acceptance of the
finding of no competition between the two groups seemed to fly in the
face of elementary economic analysis.
The stipulated record, plus three elusive opinions, makes the Meat
Drivers case a doubtful basis for generalization. Nevertheless, that case
foreshadows the possibility that the legality of union-induced pricefixing by businessmen-workers is not to turn on the distinction between
"employees" and "independent contractors." Presumably, the substitutability of the businessmen for unionized employees will legalize
the cartellization of the former. But it is not certain whether that condition is to be a necessary condition for the legality of cartellization of
the businessman-worker.
Market Restraints Potentially Detrimental to ParticipatingEmployers
Union power is, of course, checked to the extent that employers are
able to reduce costs by substituting nonunion for union materials, by
resorting to labor-saving equipment, or by subcontracting and similar
arrangements. Unions have, however, sought to limit such checks not
only by extending organization but also by restricting employers in their
purchase or use of intermediate components and services.
Although such restrictions on purchases may be viewed as operating
on product markets, their impact on acquiescent employers is not essentially different from the impact of union power exercised in the
labor market. In both cases, the result is presumably some upward pressure on costs, a result that employers have every incentive to avoid. Since
participating employers do not derive any commercial benefit (labor
peace aside) from such restrictions, they do not, under what is probably
the prevailing interpretation of Allen Bradley, run afoul of the Sherman
Act." 3 Under that interpretation Allen Bradley does not prohibit unionemployer combinations from providing sheltered markets to other em113 See, e.g., Davis Pleating & Button Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 145
F. Supp. 864, 865-66 (S.D. Cal. 1956); Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 113
F. Supp. 409, 410-11 (ED. Mo. 1953); cf. East Texas Motor Freight Line v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10, 12 (5th Cir. 1947); Anderson Friberg, Inc. v. Justin
R. Clary & Son, 98 F. Supp. 75, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also California Sportswear &
Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835, 849, 851-53 (1957).
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ployers through direct restraints on product competition; rather Allen
Bradley means only that employer-beneficiaries of such restraints may
not invoke or accept the aid of unions in order to establish or maintain
such restraints. Where, however, such beneficiaries combine with a union
and with their employer customers, there is a greater likelihood of a
violation. Indeed, such liability was, prior to Allen Bradley, imposed in
United States v. Brims,114 among other cases" 5 and remains consistent
with the "business monopoly" rationale of Allen Bradley.
Where customers for the products involved are effectively unionized,
the union can exclude nonunion suppliers without any direct participation by their unionized competitors. Such exclusion can be effectuated
through the union's power to compel unionized purchasers to boycott
nonunionized suppliers, thereby reserving the market for the unionized
firms. If such arrangements are not illegal under the Sherman Act when
effectuated by union-purchaser combinations, their unlawfulness, solely
because of the involvement of sellers in direct competition with the
excluded firms, appears to result from the combination of market restraints plus monopolistic benefit to some of the participating employers.
Such involvement may, of course, suggest that the protected suppliers
are active sponsors of market restriction schemes rather than passive
beneficiaries of union job-protection arrangements, or it may suggest
that union officials, although ostensibly protecting employee interests,
are in fact protecting the interests of selected employers and may be receiving venal rewards for these services. 116 Plainly, those considerations
do not necessarily affect the extent to which competition in the sale
of components is directly restrained in particular situations. Nevertheless, under either assumption, the reason for according unions a qualified
exemption from the Sherman Act, viz., to permit their protection of
employee interests in the labor market, would not exist; and the withholding of that exemption is sound.
114 272 US. 549 (1926) (Combination of Chicago mill-work manufacturers, building
contractors who purchased and installed it, and the union agreed to boycott of out-ofstate nonunion mills; that agreement was implemented by refusal of union employees
of contractors to install nonunion mill-work. The Chicago manufacturers received
monopoly benefits as a result of the exclusion of competitors in the Chicago market.).
115 Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); Lumber
Prods. Ass'n v. United States, 144 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds,
sub nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947). Cf.
United States v. Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957) (upholding a
complaint against union and employer "as conspirators which sought to eliminate the
use of pre-glazed products in the Chicago market, except for the products supplied by
Hamilton Glass or other co-conspirators." The opinion does not indicate the machinery
by which certain suppliers were allegedly exempted from the boycott.)
116 Such pay-offs were proscribed by § 302, Title III of the LMRA, 61 Stat.
157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1958), amended by the LMRDA of 1959, 73 Stat. 537, 29
U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. V, 1963).
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The Limits of the Labor Market Exemption
Union activity in the labor market relating to such matters as
wages and hours is, of course, linked to the product market because of
the connection between costs, supply and price. Nevertheless, such activity is the raison d'etre for labor unions and is generally exempt from
the Sherman Act. The applicability of that exemption is, however,
uncertain when anticompetitive repercussions on the product market
of participating employers are found to be the deliberate objective,
rather than the ancillary result, of otherwise conventional collective
bargaining arrangements.
The difficulties involved are illustrated by recent litigation involving
the United Mine Workers. In Lewis v. Pennington,"7 the jury brought
in a substantial damage verdict against the UMW, after having been
charged, in part, that multiemployer agreements fixing wages and barring the participating employers from buying or selling coal produced
by companies that did not observe union standards constituted a violation of the Sherman Act, if those agreements were the "result of an
agreement with large coal operators to drive small operators out of
business.""u 8 Although the court's charge endangers customary provi117 1961 Trade Cas. 78125, 78132 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963),
rev'd sub nom. Pennington v. UMW, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585 (1965). The opinions in the
Supreme Court are discussed in the "Epilogue," beginning on p. 714 infra. For earlier
UMW demands that raised antitrust issues, see Penello v. UMW, 88 F. Supp. 935, 941
(D.D.C. 1950).
118 1961 Trade Cas. at 78135, 78136. The reports of the Pennington case do not
clearly describe the bargaining pattern in the bituminous coal industry. According to
NLRB reports, industry negotiations, since 1950, have begun with the Bituminous Coal
Operator's Association, representing the Northern Appalachian group. The terms of
the agreement between that association and the UMW are then presented to other
associations and to individual operators. Those procedures have resulted in uniform
agreements covering about 75% of bituminous coal production. See United Mine
Workers, 144 N.L.R.B. 228 (1963). The Board has described the foregoing bargaining
patterns in decisions condemning boycott provisions similar to those involved in
Pennington. See also United Mine Workers, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1964).
The cross claimant in Pennington had not been a member of any of the employer
associations but had entered into the BCOA agreement as a result of a variety of union
pressures.
The trial court also instructed the jury to consider the following additional matters if,
and only if, they were "a part of the conspiracy": (I) the UMW's approaches to the
Secretary of Labor for the purpose of raising the minimum wages fixed under the
Walsh-Healey Act (id. at 78135); (2) the efforts to reduce the amount of spot-coal purchased by the TVA from companies not meeting union standards and dumping of coal
in the spot market (id. at 78127-28, 78137); and (3)the contract provisions barring companies with substandard wages from leasing mining lands owned by the signatories to
the agreement (id. at 78127, 78135). The charge of approaches to government officials raises a substantial question under Eastern Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127
(1961), but the Noerr case is distinguishable on the ground that in Pennington the
approach to officials was only one element of a larger "conspiracy." Cf. id. at 140.
It should also be noted that the union had a substantial investment in some of the
larger companies charged with predatory price cutting. See 1961 Trade Cas. at 78128.
Accordingly, the union may have had a commercial incentive for eliminating corn-
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sions of collective bargaining agreements, it is compatible with the Allen
Bradley rule. The provisions involved were to be condemned only if
they had been prompted by the participating employers', as well as the
union's, specific purpose of driving the former's competitors to the wall.
Arrangements directed toward that end and particularly the boycott
provisions, 119 if they had been developed by the employer group, would
have been illegal. 120 Under Allen Bradley participation or instigation
by the UMW, even though prompted by the ultimate purpose of benefiting employees, inculpates the union rather than exculpating the employers.
The foregoing argument, despite its formal appeal, involves formidable practical difficulties. It makes the legality of a classic union objective, uniform rates among competitive firms, turn on slippery issues
of motivation.' 21 It requires unions to choose between uniformly higher
wages for an entire industry and the survival of marginal firms; for
whenever a union pursuing wage uniformity agrees to costs that may be
beyond the capacity of such firms that are subject to the union's power,
the foreseeable consequence, and hence the consequence "intended" by
the union and the participating employers, may be said to have been the
elimination of the weaker firms. Moreover, that intention may be inferred whether the weaker firms are members of a multiemployer unit
or are subject to wage patterns fixed in bargaining in which they have
122
no direct voice.
petitors. The trial court, however, charged that the union's substantial investment did
not constitute a violation. Id. at 78134. The problems resulting from the union's dual
status will not be pursued here. See Streiffer v. Seafarers' Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp.
602 (E.D. La. 1958); Note, Union Investment in Business: A Source of Conflict of
Interest, 46 MINN. L. Rlv. 573 (1962).
119 Those provisions in Pennington create special difficulties under the Sherman Act
because the concerted boycotts were directed at potential suppliers who were also
competitors of the boycotting firms. Insofar as the latter sold more than they bought,
they presumably gained a monopoly benefit from their participation in the boycott.
120 See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
121 In Pennington that difficulty was aggravated by (1) a jury trial, (2) a complex
record, and (3) the reception of evidence of violence as bearing on the conspiracy issue.
See 325 F.2d at 810.
122 Suppose, e.g., that several substantial producers individually agreed to high
wages and a most-favored-nation clause requiring the union to secure similar terms
from other employers. Suppose also that other firms, because of a less intensive use of
capital, were driven to the wall by higher wages and that had been the expressed
purpose of the union and some of the employers. The consequences would be no
different from those alleged in Pennington. In the case supposed, the parallel action
required by the agreements might constitute a basis for finding implied conspiracy. See
note 54 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, where the employers to be
eliminated were not members of the bargaining unit, the requirement that the union
impose the same terms on them might be attacked as incompatible with the union's
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Pennington thus arises from, and highlights, the basic tension between
the object of Allen Bradley and the Sherman Act, on the one hand, and
the national policy in favor of collective bargaining, on the other hand.
Allen Bradley is designed to prevent employer exploitation of the bargaining process as an instrument of employer monopoly, but collective
bargaining, even when restricted to such traditional matters as wages
and without any tainted purposes on the part of employers, may, willy
nilly, have anticompetitive effects in the product market.
A solution that would limit the threat that Pennington poses to collective bargaining would be in order. But the cases scarcely provide a
principled basis for an escape from the difficulties involved. To be sure,
it is arguable that Apex excluded wage bargaining from the Sherman
Act,1 23 but Apex plainly was not concerned with wage determinations

exploited by employers as a method of excluding competitors. Indeed,
Apex's reaffirmation of the vitality of Coronado 11124 implied that such
purposeful attacks on competition in sales of the employers' final product
remained subject to the act. Another possibility would be to distinguish
Allen Bradley on the ground that the wage agreements in Pennington
did not involve any price-fixing or any other direct encroachment on the
product market. Finally, it is also arguable that the NLRA protection
of both wage bargaining and multi-employer organization should not be
contingent on matters as elusive as the intent imputed to the parties.
But that argument merely asserts that the policy of collective bargaining
should prevail over the Sherman Act even though the dominant members
of multiemployer groups purposefully participate in converting their
bargaining alliance into a weapon against their associates or against
competitors denied an effective voice in the determination of wagesa result that is far from attractive. A similar assertion of the paramountcy
of the NLRA over the Sherman Act lies behind arguments for plenary
or primary jurisdiction of the NLRB when "mandatory bargaining" is
involved-arguments considered below.125
Jewel Tea

26

involved a situation that was in an important sense the

obligation to bargain in good faith. But see text accompanying note 121 supra and
note 123 infra.
123

See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940).

124

Id. at 511-12.

See text accompanying notes 137-54 infra.
Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL-CIO, 274 F.2d
217 (7th Cir.) (affirming, on interlocutory appeal, denial of motion to dismiss), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960); 215 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (complaint dismissed after
trial), rev'd, 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 85 Sup. Ct. 1597 (1965). The statement
of facts in the text is based on the trial court's opinion after trial, rather than the
record. See epilogue for a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion.
125
120
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obverse of Pennington-onein which a collectively bargained restriction
on marketing, challenged under the Sherman Act, was defended on the
ground that the only purpose of the marketing restriction was the protection of traditional employee interests. The challenged provision barred
retail food stores in the Chicago area from selling fresh meat at night
or on Sundays; it had been pushed by the union during negotiations
and had been agreed to by an employer association that in the negotiations had apparently represented independent stores as well as Jewel
Tea, the plaintiff. The plaintiff, after a favorable strike vote, agreed to
the restriction. 2 7 A similar provision of long standing had originally
been designed to promote the union's objective of limiting working hours
and had, apparently, been negotiated prior to the institution of multiemployer bargaining. 28 Although the plaintiff had alleged that one
group of employers, the independents, had favored that provision and
had "conspired" with the union to achieve it, that allegation failed of
proof. The union, the trial court found, had fashioned the marketing
restriction solely to serve its own interests in hours of work, work loads,
work jurisdiction, and compensation. 129 Agreements concerning those
127 The reviewing court rejected the defense of "pari delicto" on the ground that the
plaintiff's participation had been induced by economic necessity. See 331 F.2d at 550-51.
128 See 215 F. Supp. at 841-42. The earlier agreement barred service to customers
after 6:00 p.m. Whether that prohibition applied to service by proprietors or super-

visors, as distinguished from members of the bargaining unit, is not clear.
129 Id. at 846. To establish a connection between those legitimate union interests and
the marketing provision, the trial court reasoned as follows: (1) that provision was
necessary to protect the butchers' work jurisdiction since night sales, even though the
meat was pre-cut and sold on a self-service basis, would require incidental services,
such as replenishment of stocks, etc.; (2) that provision was necessary to avoid excessive
work loads that might arise from the need to pre-cut the meat during the day. Jewel
Tea contended that once self-service counters were stocked during the day, there would
be no need at night for further incidental services encroaching on the butchers' work
jurisdiction. The trial court, in rejecting that contention, urged "that the evidence
showed that in stores where meat is sold at night it is impractical to operate without
either butchers or other employees." Ibid. That finding might indicate only that an
enterprise would prefer to have butchers present when the agreement preserves that
option. In view of the uncertain basis for that finding, it was regrettable that the
Seventh Circuit adopted a broad and unduly abstract approach that made review of
that finding unnecessary.
If that finding had been rejected, it is plain that the union's interest in work
jurisdiction as well as work loads could have been protected by contract clauses directly
dealing with those matters. Rejection of such clauses as insufficient to protect job
opportunities would rest on the assumption that the company would publicly violate its
contractual obligations. But such an assumption would mean that the only effective
method of protecting the -union's interests would have been that of closing the stores
at night; for so long as the stores were open, sales of meat, contrary to the agreement,
were possible. Even if the union's claim that night operations would necessarily
encroach on the butchers' work-jurisdiction is accepted, that claim would raise problems
under § 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA, as amended. That section proscribes economic
pressures directed at preserving work-jurisdiction and the case for its application would
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matters, the court observed, are "terms and conditions of employment"
and are exempt from the Sherman Act. Since the disputed provision was
directed solely at advancing the union's interest in "terms and conditions," that provision, the court ruled, should itself be characterized
as a "term and condition of employment" rather than "price and market
control" and should, accordingly, be exempted from the Sherman Act. 130
The Seventh Circuit, without disturbing the factual determinations
below, reversed on the following grounds. The disputed clause dealt
with a "proprietary function"' 31 rather than with a "term and condition"
of employment. It had resulted from the collaboration of the unions and
a nonunion group and had imposed a restraint on marketing with the
necessary impact on commerce. Accordingly, under Allen Bradley, the
agreement itself was illegal. The court attached no weight to the findings
below that the clause had resulted from arm's length bargaining and
that, the agreement aside, there was no evidence of a "conspiracy" among
the employers or a segment of them to secure the marketing restriction
or otherwise to restrain competition.
Although the court's result is, as we will see, defensible, its opinion is
subject to two difficulties. First, it took an unduly narrow view of "terms
and conditions" of employment. Second, it assumed that any restraint
on marketing imposed either by multiemployer or parallel bargains, ran
afoul of Allen Bradley, without regard to whether the participating employers sought or received monopolistic benefits, actual or potential.
With respect to the first difficulty, the court excluded from "terms
and conditions" of employment the time when work was to be done as
distinguished from the length of the work period. It thus ignored that
the time of work is normally one side of a coin and operating hours the
be especially strong where a union claims work-jurisdiction but bars the employment
of its constituents at the time their work is desired by the employer. Despite doctrines
of preemption and primary jurisdiction, it appears proper for the courts to give
weight to that section in an antitrust action in the same way as weight was accorded to
§ 8(a)(5). Indeed, the case for considering § 8(b)(4)(D) is stronger because § 303 of the
LMRA gives courts independent jurisdiction of damage actions based on a violation of
the former section.
. The relationship of the ban on night sales to regulation of hours of work is more
complex and is discussed below.
130 215 F. Supp. at 846. An alternative ground for decision was that the marketing
restriction, even if it had been agreed to solely by the employers, would have been valid
under "the rule of reason." Id. at 848-49. Since that approach does not purport to give
any weight to the imposition of the restriction by collective bargaining, it will not be
pursued here; it is sufficient to note that it involves substantial difficulties, and
especially the difficulty that results from the existence of alternatives, other than
market restriction, by which the union's interests might have been protected. See 331
F.2d at 550.
131 331 F.2d at 549.
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other side, because operations normally require the services of employees.
The court's approach is, moreover, inconsistent with both a formal
analysis of the individual employment relationship and the frequency
with which the time of the work period has been dealt with in most
collective bargaining agreements and in the previous agreements of
the parties to the action. Hence, the court's dictum, if viewed as a general
delineation of the duty to bargain (the Sherman Act aside), is drawn too
narrowly.
If, however, the court's characterization is restricted to the particular
situation before it, it is easier to defend. The argument in Jewel was
that the usual interdependence between operating and working time
did not exist. The company was not requesting night work, but only
night sales-sales that allegedly could be made through self-service
without the presence of bargaining unit employees and without encroachment on their usual work assignments. Under those circumstances,
"terms and conditions" of employment does not in any direct way
embrace marketing hours. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the NLRA,
and apart from any Sherman Act questions, marketing hours might
constitute an item of mandatory bargaining. That result would appear
to follow from the acceptance of the union's contention that night sales
of meat through self-service markets would generate strong pressure
for night operation of service markets and, accordingly, for night work
by some members of the unit. Under those circumstances marketing
hours would probably have been deemed to have had a sufficiently
close relationship to wages, hours, etc. to have been a mandatory item of
bargaining. 132 The Seventh Circuit's failure to consider that relationship
obviously undermines its characterization of marketing hours as a
"proprietary function." But the correctness of that characterization is
not conclusive of the issue involved unless it is assumed that the antitrust
question turns on characterization for the purpose of the NLRA-an
assumption examined later and rejected.
A more formidable difficulty arises from the court's premise that any
restraint imposed on the marketing of goods and services by a unionemployer combination is ipso facto illegal. That premise ignores that
restraints imposed by collective bargaining on purchases of intermediate
components and services do not appear to run afoul of the Sherman Act.
Similarly, where restraints are imposed on sales of final products, e.g.,
sales to "unfair" firms, a violation would not appear to result, for such
restraints do not involve the kinds of benefit which employers, collective
bargaining aside, seek to achieve by collusive arrangements. Under this
analysis the critical difficulty posed by Jewel Tea is whether the market132

See Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293 (1959).
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ing restriction should be invalidated because it relates directly to competition in final products and because it might provide benefits to one
group of employers who were or may have been opposed to night marketing because they lacked self-service counters. If such employers had
agreed among themselves to secure the elimination of night sales and had
invoked the union's aid, a violation would presumably have been
established. To ban such an agreement, even though it occurs within the
context of collective bargaining, is to cut down slippery issues concerning
the origination of, and the purpose behind, arrangements that directly
restrain competition in final product markets and that potentially benefit
some or all of the participating employers. Furthermore, even when the
union is the actuating force behind such arrangements and even when
they are designed to advance legitimate union interests, they are not essentially different from arrangements condemned under Allen Bradley.
Thus, if a union were to press for price fixing of the employers' final
products as a method of financing a wage increase, the employers' agreement in the context of arm's length collective bargaining would not
legalize the price restraints. An acceptable basis for distinguishing such
price restraints from the market restriction in Jewel Tea is not readily
discernible. In both situations the restraints on final product competition
are designed to advance legitimate employee interests. In both situations
such protection is sought not by direct regulation of the terms and conditions of employment but by regulation of competition. In both situations there is the possibility that some of the participating employers
will benefit from the restraints involved. Indeed, in Jewel Tea, it seems
likely that the primary importance of the marketing restriction lay in its
protection of the independents against nighttime competition; for that restriction was scarcely necessary to protect the butchers employed by the
stores selling at night against nightwork, or against overwork during the
day, or against any significant encroachment on their traditional work
jurisdiction.13 But that restriction was necessary to protect the employers
opposed to night operations and their employees against the pressure of
nighttime sales by others. Such sales might, as already suggested, have
generated pressure on independents without self-service counters to
stay open and thereby would have exerted pressure for nightwork by
butchers. Furthermore, the high cost of such operations might have adversely affected the interests of the independents' employees. Such adverse
effects might also have obtained if the refusal of independents to operate
at night resulted in their loss of daytime business. But the foregoing
considerations merely indicate that competition in product markets may
adversely affect some firms and their employees. The same effects might
133

See note 129 supra.
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result from vigorous price competition that attracted consumers away
from independents. Such effects do not warrant price fixing under the
umbrella of collective bargaining, and it is not easy to see why they
should warrant restrictions on marketing hours which may benefit some
firms and which directly invade the consumers' interests.
The condemnation of such restraints without any requirement of showing specific intent on the part of the employers or the union to restrain

competition would avoid slippery evidentiary issues-precisely the kind
of issues that the lower courts found critical in Pennington. If it is
desirable to avoid such issues with respect to wage determination, it is not
easy to see why they should be confronted with respect to market restrictions, such as those involved in Jewel Tea. Such issues could be reduced
by drawing a line between employers' markets for their final products
and their labor markets and by proscribing direct restraints on the former
market by union-employer combinations. Because of the inextricable
connection between those two markets, unions might be able to achieve
13 4
indirectly what they could not achieve by direct market regulation.
Nevertheless, the proscription of such direct regulation would presumably
obstruct the development of anticompetitive arrangements impinging
13
directly on the final product market by unions and employer groups.
Despite some dubious aspects of the Seventh Circuit's approach, it has
at least that desirable result.

Jewel Tea and Pennington have also raised issues as to the impact of
the NLRA on the jurisdiction of the federal courts to apply the Sherman
134 For example, in Jewel Tea the union might have sought to make night sales
prohibitively expensive by demanding additional butchers during the day for the
stated purpose of absorbing the increased work loads or by demanding a highly paid
complement of butchers at night to perform work incidental to self-service sales.
Presumably, those demands would have been exempt from the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the Pennington approach might result in their condemnation if their "purpose"
was shown to be the imposition of a marketing restriction.
135 In National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923),
reversing, 287 Fed. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1923), the Court upheld a collective bargaining
arrangement considerably more restrictive than that involved in Jewel Tea. The former
agreement provided that manufacturers of hand-blown glass should be divided into
two groups, each of which was permitted to operate only during the portion of the
year assigned to it. In upholding the agreement the Court rested on the "rule of
reason" rather than any special immunity for unions or collective bargaining. The
Court's decision seems to be an aberration. The Court subsequently held the Sherman
Act inapplicable to employer agreements on hiring halls and prerequisites for employment notwithstanding the declaration in § 6 of the Clayton Act that the "labor of a
human being is not . . . an article of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1958). See Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926). Furthermore, United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), despite its uncertainties, has
been read as making an agreement among competitors to limit the supply of a
commodity as intrinsically unreasonable and illegal. See Loevinger, The Rule of
Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23, 28-29 (1964).

1963]

LABOR UNIONS AND ANTITRUST

Act to collective bargaining agreements. Concurrent jurisdiction of several
tribunals involves the possibility of conflicting determinations of issues
that may be common to proceedings under each of the statutes. In order
to avoid such conflict, it has been urged that judicial competence should
be held to have been displaced by that of the Board or, at least, that
courts should withhold adjudication until the Board has dealt with
conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited under the NLRA.
Thus, in Jewel Tea the union has urged that the Seventh Circuit,
acting independently of, and prior to, the Board, instructed the district
court "to enjoin as a violation of the Sherman Act what the Board may
compel as a duty under the NLRA."136 But that argument toots only
one horn of the dilemma, for the Board, if its jurisdiction were exclusive, might also compel as a duty under the NLRA what courts might
condemn as a violation of the Sherman Act.
The argument in a case such as Jewel Tea for plenary and exclusive
Board jurisdiction appears to rest on a misconception of the purpose
of the duty to bargain and its relationship to the Sherman Act. That
duty is designed in general to promote industrial peace and to give
employees, through their representatives, a voice in the determination
of wages, hours, conditions of employment and in other decisions affecting
those matters. 3 7 That duty is concerned essentially with employer-union
relationships and not with the impact of such relationships on competitive markets. The Board in delineating the scope of that duty has,
in general, not been concerned with the preservation of such markets.
Consequently, the characterization of a demand as bargainable under
the NLRA (the Sherman Act aside) would not necessarily validate that
demand under the latter act-unless the NLRA were held to constitute a repeal, pro tanto, of the Sherman Act whenever collective bargaining on "mandatory items" was involved-an issue considered later.
An illustration may clarify the foregoing discussion. In a situation
where employee compensation is a fixed percentage of product prices,
the union, in order to raise wages, might, insist that a group of employers
136 Petition for Cert., p. 28, Local Unions, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., cert. granted, 379 U.S. 813 (1964) (No. 240, 1964 Term). See also United States v.
Fish Smokers Trade Council, 183 F. Supp. 227, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Brief for the AFLCIO as Amicus Curiae, p. 21, UMW v. Pennington, cert. granted, 377 U.S. 929 (1964)
(No. 48, 1964 Term).
137 Cf. Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959). The NLRB's
recent decisions have expanded the scope of the bargaining duty. See, e.g., Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), modified, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962),
enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 963 (1964) (No. 610, 1963
Term; renumbered No. 14, 1964 Term), motion to move from sum. cal. granted, 377
U.S. 962 (1964). For a critical discussion of the evolution of the duty to bargain, see Cox
& Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargainingby the National Labor Relations Board,
63 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1950).
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adhere to a minimum price schedule. Such a demand could be said to
have a sufficiently direct link with wages to constitute a bargainable item
under NLRA precedents. 138 But that characterization would not resolve
the issue of whether the price-fixing agreement would be repugnant to
the Sherman Act. Furthermore, if all of the employers acquiesced in the
demand for price fixing, no question of the scope of the bargaining
duty would even be presented to the Board.5 9 But the Sherman Act
question would remain; indeed, such questions usually arise as a consequence of agreement rather than failure to agree. It is true that that
question might be raised in a Board proceeding if an employer defended
his refusal to bargain concerning price fixing on the ground that agreement would violate the Sherman Act. Such a defense would presumably
require the Board to consider not only its doctrine as to bargainability
but also whether the demand, if otherwise bargainable, was barred by,
or perhaps raised a substantial question under, the Sherman Act. But
consideration of the Sherman Act would be necessary not because bargainability under the NLRA coincides with legality under the Sherman
Act, but because the Board generally is required to take account of other
federal laws and unpreempted state law in its administration of the
NLRA.140 That requirement scarcely means that the Board has plenary
jurisdiction of all federal law and all unpreempted state law that may be
implicated by a bargain or by negotiations. The corollary of the foregoing analysis is that the duty to bargain is subject to the Sherman Act
and not vice versa.
Although the Board in some cases might consider the Sherman Act
questions in the course of proceedings under the NLRA, it does not follow
that the Board should have exclusive or plenary jurisdiction over such
questions. It has no special competence with respect to the Sherman Act
as such. Its remedial powers are quite different from the sanctions that
138 Cf. Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-94 (1959).
139 "[]he Board has no general commission to police collective bargaining agree-

ments and strike down contractual provisions in which there is no element of unfair
labor practice." Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 108
(1958). Furthermore, the parties may voluntarily bargain on matters that fall outside
of the area of mandatory bargaining.
140 The Supreme Court, citing Allen Bradley, stated in 1959 that "[F]ederal law sets
some outside limits . . . on what [the parties'] . . . agreement may provide ....
Local
24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296; cf. American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B.
1302 (1944). See also Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 110-11
(1958); Truck Drivers Local 728, Teamsters Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 399, 410 (1957); Fort
Indus. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1287, 1299 (1948). Whether such limits are exceeded by a
bargaining demand is relevant to a party's duty to bargain. Thus a union or an employer faced with a seniority clause discriminating against Negroes could presumably
defend its refusal to bargain on the ground of a violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
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support that act. Furthermore, where Congress has sought to give an
administrative agency power to grant exemptions from the Sherman Act,
it has usually done so explicitly. 141 In the absence of such authorization,
a determination by an agency that a given transaction is compatible with
the Sherman Act does not automatically foreclose the application of the
act in other proceedings. 42 Neither the NLRA, as amended, nor its
legislative history suggests such a purpose; nor do they suggest that the
jurisdiction of the courts and the Federal Trade Commission with respect
to the Sherman Act is to be displaced where collective bargaining is
involved.143
Such displacement is not warranted by the cases preempting state juris44
diction over matters arguably prohibited or protected by the NLRA.
Those cases are designed primarily to bar the application of state substantive doctrines and state procedures and scarcely control the issue of
whether the jurisdiction of other federal tribunals charged generally with
the enforcement of the fundamental national policy embodied in the
45
Sherman Act should be obliterated.
An alternative to displacing judicial competence is a doctrine of
141 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350, 353 (1963);
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 487, 490 (1962).
142 See United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
143 Cf. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 490 (1962).
144 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). If the
preemption cases were followed, judicial competence to apply the Sherman Act to
collective bargaining agreements would, in some cases, be ousted whether or not an
agreement dealt with a mandatory item. If the agreement encompassed a mandatory
item of bargaining, ouster would rest on the ground that judicial interference with
the bargaining would encroach on "protected activities." If the union, faced by
employer resistance, had pressed a demand for a nonmandatory item to the point of
impasse, the union would have engaged in "prohibited activity," viz., refusal to bargain
in good faith. With respect to nonmandatory items the union's violation of the NLRA,
as amended, would depend on whether the employers had resisted the union's demand.
Under the Garmon approach a show of employer resistance to a nonmandatory item
and a resultant impasse would be sufficient to oust the courts of jurisdiction-a dubious
result that would invite disingenuous maneuvers in the bargaining process.
145 "Preemption" doctrine has not destroyed the competence of federal or state
courts over contract issues overlapping with unfair labor practices. See Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962). Nevertheless, it should be observed that § 10(a) of the
NLRA, as amended, preserves the Board's plenary jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices overlapping with contractual issues.
But that difficulty does not apply to judicial enforcement of § 303 of the LMRA,
providing for damage actions for violations of the provisions of § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA,
as amended. Such enforcement has been held to be completely independent of the
Board. International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952). The case for independent judicial competence for enforcement of the Sherman
Act is considerably stronger, since that act has different purposes and provisions and
hitherto has been left exclusively to judicial enforcement. Cf. Meltzer, Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations II, 59 COLUM. L. Rxv. 269, 287 (1959).
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primary jurisdiction, 146 under which courts confronted with Sherman
Act questions would defer adjudication until the Board had disposed
of NLRA issues on the scope of mandatory bargaining. The difficulty
with that suggestion is that such characterization would generally be
irrelevant or of only minor significance on the Sherman Act issue. The
NLRA governs the mode or procedure for reaching agreement; except
in a few specialized situations, it does not govern the legality of the resultant agreement. Furthermore, the Board, unlike regulatory agencies,
does not pass on the desirability of contract terms. Nevertheless, it is
arguable that NLRA characterization has some relevance in that it
identifies legitimate union interests that should be taken into account by
courts in their administration of the Sherman Act. But such relevancy,
even assuming that it exists, appears too insubstantial to call for primary
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the notorious slowness of the Board's machinery, coupled with the slowness of antitrust proceedings, is an additional reason to permit the courts and the Federal Trade Commission to
147
act without waiting for Board characterization.
The argument for displacement of, as distinguished from postponement of, judicial competence is, it is worth emphasizing, an argument for a fundamental alteration of substantive standards under the
guise of a jurisdictional alteration. 148 The underlying contention appears
to be that collective bargaining is so basically anticompetitive that Congress, by protecting the bargaining process, has rendered the Sherman
Act inapplicable either to all collective bargaining agreements or, at
least, to those embracing mandatory items. But Allen Bradley, which was
decided after the passage of the Wagner Act, rejected that far-reaching
contention; 149 hence, the issue becomes whether subsequent amendments
r
3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19.04 (1958, Supp. 1963).
See generally Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust Laws, 102

146 See
147

U. PA. L. REV. 577, 591-92, 603 (1954), for a caution against a wooden emphasis on
"expertise" as distinguished from an approach seeking to balance all relevant
considerations.
It is worth noting that the case for primary jurisdiction is stronger where the issue
is whether particular groups are "employees" or independent contractors, for in such a
situation the issue of whether illegal price fixing is involved will coincide with the
issue of characterization. And a strong argument may be made that judicial action
should be guided by the Board's characterization. Cf. Marine Engineers v. Interlake
S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962). But even in the "employee" or "independent contractor"
situation, the case for primary jurisdiction is doubtful because of the delay factor and
the express legislative preference for the application of common law concepts in
determining the existence of an independent contractor relationship. See note 97 supra.
148 Cf. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HAiv. L. Rav. 436, 438 (1954).
149 The Court emphasized the need to reconcile the two congressional policies and
the absence of any congressional purpose wholly to exempt collective bargaining from
the Sherman Act. 325 U.S. at 806, 810.
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to the NLRA may be viewed as a repudiation of that case. Two kinds of
amendments may be invoked to support such a view: (1) those proscribing
practices, such as hot-cargo provisions and secondary pressures, 5 0 that
have been useful in restraining product competition and (2) the legislative endorsement of multiemployer bargaining. 151
Neither the language nor the legislative history of those amendments
suggest that their purpose was to reject the "business monopoly" rationale
on which Allen Bradley rested. Thus, the secondary boycott amendments
were designed to plug the "loopholes" in the Taft-Hartley provisions and
to eliminate the questionable distinctions that had developed with respect to hot-cargo provisions.152 There is nothing in the legislative history
to suggest that their purpose was to liberate collective bargaining from
restrictions imposed by the Sherman Act. 153 Similarly, the legalization of
multiemployer bargaining was designed to promote a better "balance"
between the bargaining power of employers and unions. The Sherman
Act and Allen Bradley were concerned with a wholly different objective,
preserving a balance between the interests of union-employer combinations, on the one hand, and those of other employers and of the general
public on the other. There is nothing in the endorsement of employer
bargaining coalitions that suggests that union-employer action endangering the interests of competing employers and consumers was to be freed
from the limitations imposed by the Sherman Act.
Resort to NLRA amendments to displace the Sherman Act with
respect to collective bargaining would run counter to the basic rule
against repeals by implicationlS -- a rule that should have special force
for a statute, such as the Sherman Act, that embodies a central value of
our tradition.
150 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964); and National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), added
by 73 Stat. 543 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964), discussed in text accompanying note 155-63 infra.
151 See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
152 See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, 44 MINN. L. Rav. 257, 271-72 (1959).
153 The 80th Congress rejected proposals for withdrawing the "labor exemption"
from union activities involving price fixing and other direct market restraints. That
action was explained on the ground that boycotts, which had been used to effectuate
such restraints, were regulated by the Taft-Hartley amendments. There was, however,
no suggestion that the refusal to eliminate the labor exemption was intended to expand
the labor exemption into areas previously subject to the Sherman Act. See H. Conf.
Rep. No. 510, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947), appearing in 1 NLRB, LEG.
Hisr. OF LABOR-,MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT (1947) 569. Compare Winter, Collective
Bargainingand Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 59 n.217 (1963).
154 See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
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Restraints on Product Markets and the NLRA
Amendments to the NLRA have supplemented Allen Bradley by outlawing certain secondary pressures and so-called hot-cargo provisions' 55weapons that unions have used to restrict transactions in the product
market. The applicability of those amendments does not turn on concerted action by, or benefit to, employer groups. 156 Accordingly, those
amendments have led to the suggestion that they have reduced the need
for additional legislation condemning union involvement in what are,
from some points of view, restraints on product competition.1 7
In appraising such suggestions an important consideration is the
failure of the NLRA to reach a variety of practices that directly restrict
the sale of goods and services without violating the Allen Bradley rule.
Thus, the broad language of section 8(e) of the NLRA (the ban on hotcargo provisions) has already been significantly limited by interpretation.
The language, read literally, applies to any agreement, expressed or
implied, whereby any employer agrees to refrain from dealing in, using,
or handling the products of another employer. 58 But section 8(e) appears
to have been aimed at more limited restrictions, i.e., those which bar one
employer from dealing with another because the latter either is not on
good terms with the contracting union or another ufiion or pays "substandard" wages.' 59
The NLRB, limiting section 8(e) in accordance with that purpose,
has upheld agreements and pressures designed to preserve jobs within
155 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964); and § 8(e), added by 73 Stat. 543 (1959), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964). See generally Leskin, job Security and Secondary
Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(bX4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 1000 (1965).
156 Ibid.
157 See Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor-the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley,
13 LAB. L.J. 957, 963 (1962).
158 Section 8(e) prohibits agreements whereby (1) an employer agrees to cease or
refrain from handling products of another employer and (2) by which an employer
agrees to cease doing business with another employer. Since the term "refrain" does
not appear in the latter prohibition, it is arguable that agreements barring the subcontracting of services are illegal only if they disturb pre-existing relationships. But
that argument has properly been rejected by the Board. See NLRB v. Joint Council of
Teamsters, 338 F.2d 23, 30-31 (9th Cir. 1964); Comment, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 725, 749-50

(1960).
159 See Comment, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 725, 749-50 (1960). See also Comment, 62 MiCH.
L. REv. 1176, 1178-79 (1964). But cf. Fairweather, Implied Restriction on Work Movements-The Pernicious Crow of Labor Contract Construction, 38 NOTR DAME LAW.
518 (1963). In Orange Belt Dist. Council No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir.
1964), the validity of clauses limiting subcontracting to employers meeting union
standards was upheld. The court, in rejecting the NLRB's apparent proscription of such
clauses, urged that they were designed to protect primary work opportunities by
removing the incentive to subcontract. See also Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 335 F.2d
709 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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the bargaining unit.160 The Board has, however, applied that section

to condemn agreements designed to acquire new work for the unit, as
distinguished from work that has been traditionally or regularly performed therein.161 It is not easy to see a basis for that distinction in
the language or purpose of section 8(e), even though it is conceded that a
union's effort to capture new work is likely to be more disruptive than
its effort to retain old work. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia has questioned that distinction and implied that the
union effort5 to expand jobs should not be limited by prior work-jurisdiction.16 2 The job-protection justification has also served to validate comprehensive no-subcontracting clauses and clauses barring the use of prefabricated materials. 163 However the issues on the scope of section
8(e) are finally resolved, one point is clear: the limitations already engrafted on that section, tested by the objective of maintaining open
channels of trade, are paradoxical. They permit a total blockade barring
dealings with unionized as well as nonunion firms, while condemning a
limited blockade applicable only to nonunion suppliers.
160 See Orange Belt Dist. Council v. NLRB, supranote 159.
161 See Meat & Highway Drivers (Swift & Co.), 143 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1229-30 (1963),
enforcement denied (in part), Teamsters Local 710 v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Ohio Valley Carpenter's Dist. Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 986 (1962);
Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees (Minn. Milk), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1317 (1961).
162 See Teamsters Local 710 v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1964); see also
Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1176, 1188 (1964).
163 See Ohio Valley Carpenters' Dist. Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 986 (1962). But cf.
Glaziers Union, Local 27, 99 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1952), enforced sub noma., Joliet Contractors
Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 606 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953). The dissenting
members of the Board relied on the make-work point (99 N.L.R.B. at 1398-99), which
was passed over in silence by the Board majority and by the reviewing court. Where a
subcontractor who has agreed with a union not to install prefabricated material agrees
to supply only labor to a general contractor (or owner) who specifies the proscribed
material, a strike against the subcontractor to enforce his contractual obligation has
been held to violate § 8(b)(4)(B). Ohio Valley Carpenters' Dist. Council, 144 N.L.R.B. 91
(1963) (Member Brown dissenting), enforced sub nom. Carpenters' Dist. Council v.
NLRB, 338 F.2d 958 (6th Cir. 1964). The rationale for this result was that the subcontractor had been "powerless to effect the result sought" by the union (144 N.L.R.B.
at 93); hence, the ultimate object of its pressure had been to bring about a cessation
of business between the subcontractor and the party with power over the disputed
work. There are, however, weighty opposing considerations disregarded by the Board:
First, its approach invites subcontractors to circumvent restrictions embodied in collective bargaining agreements through arrangements reserving to others power to
choose the materials to be used. Such arrangements are not calculated to promote
respect for agreements or harmonious labor relations. Second, pressures designed to
cause a subcontractor to boycott prefabricated material and thereby to preserve traditional work for the bargaining unit are deemed "primary" even though such pressures
force a cessation of dealings with suppliers. It is not clear why pressures on the subcontractor designed to cause the general contractor to engage in such a boycott are
secondary rather than primary. The purpose of such pressures is, after all, to preserve
traditional bargaining unit work rather than to affect the general contractor's labor
relations.
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The foregoing survey has pointed to the following limitations in existing regulation of restrictions imposed by collective bargaining on competition by firms in the sale of goods and services:
(1) Under the Sherman Act, arrangements restricting price competition and allocating markets in the final products of employers participating in such restraints have sometimes been legitimized on the ground
that the participating employers did not "benefit" from such restrictions.
(2) There is controversy as to whether market control schemes are
legal, provided that unions impose them by arrangements with individual
employers as opposed to formal employer groups.
(3) Neither the Sherman Act nor the NLRA appears dearly to reach
arrangements designed to protect jobs traditionally within the union's
jurisdiction by proscribing the use of new materials or new equipment
or by barring all "subcontracting" without regard to the union relationships of the potential sellers.
(4) Substantial uncertainty surrounds the boundary between the labor
and the product markets as well as the appropriate method for accommodating enforcement of the Sherman Act with the Board's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of collective bargaining.
Legislation To Promote Open "Product Markets"
The first two difficulties listed above could be moderated by legislation
that condemned union participation in price fixing, territorial restrictions
of sales, direct limitation of production or sales, or regulation of the
number or kind of employers eligible to engage in a particular kind of
business activity. 64 Such regulation would plainly foreclose the formalistic
distinction announced in Allen Bradley between parallel agreements and
agreements with employer groups. It would also avoid questions as to
whether employers were unwilling beneficiaries of market control arrangements involving their final products and whether such arrangements had
produced demonstrable and significant monopoly benefits.
Such legislation has also been supported on the ground that it is important to check union power in the labor market by maintaining open
product markets. 165 It is, however, doubtful that the proposal would
constitute a meaningful check on, as distinguished from a redirection
of, union power. Nevertheless, in some cases unions have cartellized
164 Such legislation has been proposed by commentators. See Abramson, Organized
Labor and the Antitrust Laws (pts. 1-2), 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 645, 674-77 (1958);
Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252,
284 (1955).
165 Apparently, such a check was envisaged by the somewhat general proposals for
opening up product markets, made in the Labor Study Group Report published by
the COM M. FOR ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY 138-39 (1961).

1965]

LABOR UNIONS AND ANTITRUST

product markets as a means of re-enforcing or consolidating their power
over labor markets. Hence, it is possible that in limited circumstances
the desired check might be provided by the legislation in question. Such
legislation would not, however, avoid difficult questions arising from
the shadowy line between labor markets and final product markets. Thus,
prohibition of night work in enterprises employing a night shift may be
viewed as a regulation of hours of work or as a form of production control. Similarly, the UMW's well-knowni insistence on the three-day week
could have been viewed as a legitimate work-sharing device or as an
attempt to stabilize prices by production control. 166 An acceptable line
would appear to be that between restraints directly limiting volume and
those limiting volume only by way of restrictions on hours of work. Such
a line would limit legal interference with collective bargaining concerning
the incidents of the employment relationship while condemning arrangements aimed directly at product markets.
If collective bargaining is to have such freedom, there is a strong
case against illegalizing otherwise legal arrangements merely because they
were originated by employers rather than unions or because employers
could be shown to have the specific purpose of restricting competition in
the market for their final product. Such limitations on immunity would,
as already indicated, make legality turn on issues of motivation that are
both difficult of proof and largely irrelevant to the issue of whether competition has been restrained. Furthermore, such limitations ignore that
an employer, as well as a union, has an interest in the welfare of his
employees, flowing from either his economic interest in their morale
and efficiency or from ideas of businesses' social responsibility. New
patterns of bargaining, including arrangement for continuing consultation designed to avoid crisis bargaining, may be viewed as a response
to those joint interests. Such patterns further complicate the task of
determining whether unions or employers originated arrangements
bristling with the potential for market restrictions. Indeed, in some cases
such arrangements may be suggested by neutrals. To make the validity
of such arrangements depend on who initiated them or on whether the
employers resisted them is likely to promote disingenuous rhetoric and
mock resistance rather than competitive markets.
Union limitations on components, equipment and services that may
be purchased from other firms by employers in contractual relations with
the union appear to be a considerably more significant restraint on
product markets than union controls on sales of final products by employers. Again, there have been suggestions that appear to call for the
166 See Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 252, 282-83 (1955).
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proscriptions of such restraints on purchases as a means of checking
union power over labor markets 167 and preventing the waste of resources. 168 But such suggestions, like other "bad practice" legislation that
leaves the sources of union power undisturbed, raise difficult problems
of enforcement.
Such problems are illustrated by the issues raised by technological
change. Union efforts to cushion the effect of change on employees
through severance pay, retraining allowances, and similar arrangements
command broad and justifiable support. Furthermore, unions have a
legitimate interest in the health and safety of employees, an interest
that may at times serve as an actual or colorable basis for opposition to
technological change or for costly manning requirements in connection
with the use of new processes. Arrangements that are frequently desirable
methods for cushioning change may, of course, be exploited to obstruct it
completely or to delay it for long periods. Thus, unions with sufficient
power (absent legal restrictions) to block or delay technological change
frequently could do so indirectly by demands for severance pay for displaced employees and for wages and manning provisions for retaining employees that would destroy, and might indeed be calculated to destroy, the
economies of proposed changes. Even such evasive action might be preferred to direct union prohibitions of the use of new technology. Such
prohibitions differ from a union-imposed tax on change in the same
way as an import embargo differs from a tariff; they exclude suppliers
from a market without regard to the price of their output and its
potential contribution to the operations of the putative purchasers.
Furthermore, it would underestimate the complexities involved to
assume that in each case the union's tax could be nicely adjusted to the
level of the resultant economies. And insofar as union miscalculation, employer resistance, or other factors preserved some economies for employers, the new technology would break through.
Despite the foregoing considerations, it seems clear that in many situ167 Ibid.

168 The foregoing discussion is based on the assumption that enough work remains
to be done so that waste of resources is still an evil. That assumption makes it unnecessary to consider here the debate on the effect of "automation" on employment and the
possibility that waste becomes a virtue in an unemployment economy. See generally
AUTOMATION AND TECHNICAL CHANGE (Dunlop ed. 1962); Silberman, The Real News

About Automation, Fortune, Jan. 1965, p. 124. It is enough to note that an attack on
general unemployment through featherbedding is erratic and may, as in the railroads,
threaten industries acutely in need of cost reduction in order to meet competition.
Furthermore, bottlenecks resulting from waste of relatively skilled and scarce manpower resources may retard the growth necessary for a general increase in employment
and may, as a result, deny employment opportunities to those displaced by technological
change. See Comment, Drafting Problems and the Regulation of Featherbedding-An
Imagined Dilemma, 73 YALE L.J. 812, 847 (1964), and references cited therein.
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ations legal prohibitions against union bans of new technology could
be circumvented by formal demands for cushioning change that would
be prompted by the desire to block it completely. Such possibilities raise
the question of whether the law should scrutinize such formal demands
with a view to determining whether they are subterfuges designed to
block change by imposing prohibitive costs. Without such scrutiny a
legal prohibition could be easily evaded. But enforcement which sought
to determine whether demands for cushions were subterfuges would be
enormously difficult. 169 It would frequently turn on the magnitude of
demands whose form was unobjectionable. Such issues would, of course,
be complicated by the absence of generally accepted criteria for the
level of wages, severance payments, manning, or the interval for
synchronizing the introduction of new methods with employee attrition
rates, and by the special traditions and problems of diverse industries.
Although the issue is not one that permits me to be dogmatic, my judgment is that legislation should not at present authorize the intrusion
in the bargaining process that would be involved in any effort to distinguish between "good faith demands" for cushions against change and
ostensible demands for such cushions that are in fact directed at blocking
change altogether.
The foregoing considerations suggest that if the law is directly and
effectively to deal with union-sponsored obstructions to technological
change, it may have to adopt one of two difficult alternatives: (1) regulate
the bargaining process completely and not merely at the point where
the process has the potential of imposing such obstructions; or (2) limit
the power on which such obstructions rest. Otherwise, union power contained at one point could usually transform its demands to escape
the force of regulation or, at least, to introduce serious complications
into the regulatory scheme.
If regulation designed to promote open markets for components or for
services that enter into the production of an employer's final product
is rejected as impracticable, it is doubtful that there would be much
practical significance in regulation clarifying, or extending the applicability of, the Allen Bradley doctrine to restraints on competition in the
employers' final product. It is doubtful that such restraints now involve
important magnitudes, although more empirical data are required for an
informed judgment. Furthermore, such restraints on competition in the
169 Such an effort might be supplemented by regulation of union demands for
unneeded employees, unneeded services, etc. Although such regulation is difficult to
administer, the difficulties have been exaggerated. See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 812
(1964); compare the suggestion that "featherbedding" provisions should activate sanctions only after such provisions have been condemned by a regulatory tribunal. See
SLICH'r, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 68 (1947).
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employer's final product as are visible seem to involve overt collaboration
on the part of employer combinations and, consequently, are likely to be
a violation of existing law or to involve serious risks of illegality. To be
sure, litigation may have exposed such formal group action only because
it was more vulnerable to legal attack. But it is unlikely that an individual
employer will agree to price restrictions or territorial allocations unless
he has assurance that his competitors have agreed or will agree to
similar restraints. And if the union serves as the intermediary for
achieving such agreements, it is likely that liability would result under
the Allen Bradley rule. 170 This is not to suggest that. a clarification of
Allen Bradley to interdict restraints on competition in the employers'
final product would not be desirable, but only that such legislation is
unlikely to be a significant check on "excessive" union power in the
17
labor market. '
Whatever the scope of new regulation of union restraints on "product
competition," there is a troublesome question as to whether such regulation should consist of amendments to the NLRA or to the Sherman
Act. That choice turns in part on an assessment of the relative advantages
of the administrative and judicial process and of the essentially remedial
approach of the labor statute as compared with the more drastic
criminal and treble-damage sanctions that supplement the injunctive
remedies of the Sherman Act. I cannot undertake a comprehensive
discussion of those issues here.
In summary, the labor legislation route would avoid the complications
resulting from concurrent jurisdiction of the Board and the courts over
the same set of activities. It would also avoid the anomaly of drastic
criminal penalties for union conduct no more heinous than that proscribed as unfair labor practices. It would provide victims with a publicly
financed remedy-a consideration that might be of special importance to
smaller or necessitous firms. Finally, it would bring the actual (or
mythical) expertise of the Board to bear on the problems involved.
The antitrust route has, however, strongly competing advantages. An
antitrust approach would have the virtue of explicitly linking the
remedial legislation to its underlying social purpose. Furthermore,
unions engaged in market restraints sometimes have business groups as
willing collaborators. Disparate penalties and disparate modes of enforcement for co-conspirators, depending on whether they represented labor
or management, would raise serious questions of equal and fair classification-especially so when business had been bludgeoned into market170 See Sovern, supranote 157, at 961.
171 But cf. Labor Study Group Report, op. cit. supra note 165, at 138-39, which,

although not wholly clear, may reflect a contrary view.
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rigging arrangements. On the other hand, to exempt employers from
the Sherman Act merely because they had used collective bargaining
as an anticompetitive tool would give the exempted employers an unduly
favorable position compared to that of employers acting without the
aid of unions. That disparity might induce employers to seek the active aid
of unions in connection with the development and enforcement of anticompetitive arrangements. Such aid, by increasing the durability of the
arrangements, would frustrate the statutory purpose. Finally, under an
antitrust approach, aggrieved individuals could activate the legal
machinery by treble-damage and injunctive actions, and the Department
of Justice could also act without a formal private complaint. Such a
dispersion of remedies appears desirable in an area where public enforcement agencies are overburdened, where the agencies may be inept, or
politically motivated, and where formal charges by private interests are
often withheld because of fear of reprisal. Although the considerations
bearing on the appropriate remedy are closely balanced, the considerations
supporting an antitrust approach appear persuasive to me. 17 2
III
The preceding discussion has suggested that neither the general antitrust proposal nor an expanded proscription of union restraints on
product markets would be likely to result in a significant limitation on
the power of entrenched unions. Skepticism concerning the effectiveness
of such regulation, coupled with concern about, the consequences of
union power, 73 has led to suggestions for legislation that would seek
to dismantle existing bargaining structures. For example, so-called limitist proposals would seek to curb union power by a direct attack on its
source, that is, substantially industry-wide or market-wide organization
of employees by a single union. A familiar variant of such proposals would
limit union representation to the employees of a single employer, with
exceptions allowing multi-firm bargaining where small and numerous
employers in local labor markets were involved, 17 4 and would prohibit
collusion among unions on bargaining terms.
The drastic surgery contemplated by limitist proposals would, of
course, generate the most stubborn opposition from well organized and
172 But see ibid., recommending that union restrictions on product markets be dealt
with by labor laws.
173 That concern goes beyond the economic consequences of monopoly, but extends
to the impact of the increasing size and centralization of the union structure on
"internal democracy" and on the general political process-issues that cannot be
developed here.
174 See generally Lewis, The Labor-Monopoly Problems: A Positive Program, 59
J. POL. ECON. 277 (1951). See also bills referred to in note 4 supra.
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powerful groups, whose survival would be threatened. Such proposals
might, accordingly, be dismissed out of hand on the ground that they
could not in the foreseeable future command political support. But such
a disposition by political amateurs is far from satisfactory, quite apart
from the variability of political weather. Nevertheless, the intense opposition which limitist proposals would provoke cannot wholly be divorced
from the merits. Such opposition, if expressed in widespread political
strikes, would tear apart the social fabric. Such opposition would also
gravely complicate the problem of enforcement. Furthermore, the enactment of such proposals might so alienate the employee class as to increase
its support for radical alterations of our economic structure. 175 Such
objections, although difficult to assess, must be soberly weighed in connection with any legislative proposal-even though the objections may somewhat ironically underscore the power of the groups at which the legislation is aimed. On the other hand, despite important differences in degree,
similar objections are to be expected against any serious attempts to limit
union power-as is dear from the savage debate that preceded the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act. Consequently, putting aside political considerations and the possibility of massive resistance, we turn to the merits.
The principal objection .to the limitist proposal is that in some situadons it would not substantially reduce union power and that in others
it would reduce it so much as to obliterate unions as meaningful institutions.176 Such differential effects would be a function of the different
environments in which market-wide unions operate. Thus, they are found
in industries with relatively few firms (e.g., auto, rubber, steel) and
industries with numerous firms (e.g., coal, garment trades, textiles). 177 In
the oligopolistic industries the fragmentation of bargaining might be
neutralized by covert collusion, by wage leadership, pattern bargaining,
and the like. Such possibilities are especially strong because both the
unions and the employers are used to common settlements and may find
them mutually convenient. Hence, unless collusion or pattern-following
is made difficult by increasing the number of firms through dismemberment, the consequences of market-wide unions might well continue in
another guise. Nevertheless, the problem of dealing with covert collusion
is not essentially different from that problem with respect to enterprises.
Furthermore, the need to disguise collusion would hamper the exercise
of monopoly power. Finally, the resources of a national union would not
be available to finance a strike against a single firm, for the purpose of
175 Cf. R.EES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 195 (1962).

176 Lewis, supra note 174, at 281, acknowledges the risk that limitist proposals would
be over-effective.
177 See Cox, supra note 166, at 277.
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making a pattern-setting settlement. Hence, there are grounds for
believing that the level of individual settlements would be more responsive to market forces once the centralizing force of the market-wide
union were absent. No one firm could be sure that an autonomous union
bargaining with a competitor would demand or would receive a package
involving substantially the same costs. Individual firms might, accordingly,
resist demands that seemed "excessive" in relation to market considera178
tions.
Where there are many firms in an industry, the fragmentation of
bargaining jurisdiction might result in bargaining units too small to
be viable 179 and might, as already suggested, deprive unions of any
meaningful power. They might, for example, lack the power to achieve
protection against arbitrary managerial power through grievance procedures and the development of industrial jurisprudence-innovations
that have justifiably been hailed
a major contribution to an industrial
system.'8 0 If such consequences were coupled with a negligible impact on
truly strong unions in oligopolistic industries, the net effect of the limitist approach would be plainly perverse in relation to its objective of
curbing excessive union power: it would have negligible effect on strong
unions while making weak unions even weaker.
The radical institutional surgery contemplated by the proposal to
fragment existing structures into enterprise unions imposes a heavy
burden of persuasion on its proponents. That burden would be discharged
only if there were a convincing basis for concluding that the proposal
would promote a better social and economic balance. It is, however, precisely that conclusion that is so conjectural.
The limitist proposal, despite its deficiencies, has the virtue of emphasizing that if regulation is to curb union power, it must confront and
178 But cf. id. at 278-79; Lester, Reflections on the "Labor Monopoly" Issue, 55
J. POL. ECON. 513, 533 (1947). These authors urge that the international union exercises

a moderating influence on the locals. But that influence is exercised in a situation where
the international's industry-wide organization is a basic source of power and where
internal political factors may shape the local's "irresponsible demands." Such factors
would, of course, be made inoperative by the fragmentation of existing unions.
179 Such results would be reduced if enterprise unionism were qualified by permitting
a single union to represent employees in a local labor market area. But such a qualification would leave the powers of the construction unions untouched. The policies of
those unions have presented extremely serious problems, including costly jurisdictional
demarcations, racial discrimination, and price fixing. Regulation, although allowing one
union to represent the employees of more than one employer, might restrict representation by a single union to a fixed percentage of an "industry." But a general formula
for dismantling of the diverse union structures involved could scarcely avoid artificial
rigidity and unpredictable consequences.
180 See SLIcHTER, TRADE UNIONS IN A FREE SOCIErY 12 (1947); Rees, Some Non-Wage
Aspects of Collective Bargaining, in THE PUBLIC STAKE IN UNION Powut 124 (Bradley
ed. 1958).
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deal with its sources rather than with its symptoms. Perhaps others will be
able to formulate measures that will succeed in avoiding the procrustean
aspect of that proposal while providing workable criteria for an enforcing
agency. My own struggles with that problem have not been fruitful.
They do, however, suggest several possibilities that may merit consideration. One is a restriction on union expansion into more than one "industry."' 181 The proposal made by Mr. Hoffa several years ago for the
combination of all transportation workers into a single union suggests
the dangers of the present policy of laissez faire for union jurisdiction
and structure. Such a combination, which was the target of Senator
McClellan's bill,182 would be legal today. There is, however, in my view,

no justification for allowing a single union to achieve such commanding
power over the economy. It might, of course, be urged that the risk of
such leviathans must be run in order to minimize government regulation
of labor relations. But that abstraction w~as rejected a long time ago. And,
more importantly, it is plain that a hands-off policy towards union structure and jurisdiction results in increasing regulation and interventionwhich is, however, likely to be ineffective in redressing power imbalances
because of previous indifference to structure.
The drafting of a more generalized restriction on multi-industry representation would involve difficult issues, such as the following. Should
existing multi-industry structures be left intact? Should the NLRB be
barred from certifying unions with jurisdiction in one industry as a
bargaining representative in another industry, at least in the absence
of a history of substantial representation in both areas or penetration in
both areas by a single employer some of whose employees are represented
by the union involved? Should, per contra, enforcement be left wholly to
another agency, such as the Department of Justice?183 Before such issues

of detail are resolved, it would be desirable to have full data regarding
existing jurisdictional patterns and an effort to assess the consequences of
interindustry penetration in particular contexts. Legislation establishing
a commission to collect and assess such data might provide a useful
foundation for policy-making.
Proposals for legislation that is closely associated with the antitrust
tradition cannot be sharply separated from issues raised by proposed
changes in the NLRA and in the general framework in which collective
bargaining operates. 8 4 Although those issues, like the antitrust proposals,
181

See Lester, supra note 178, at 536, suggesting (semble) such a restriction quali-

fied, however, by a variety of exceptions.
182 See S.2573, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
183 See also Lester, supra note 178.

184 See, e.g., the proposals made by the Labor Study Group Report, op. cit. supra
note 165; Research and Policy Committee of the CoMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELoPMENT, UNION POWERS AND UNION FUNCTIONS

(1964).
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impinge on relative power and frequently are resolved on the basis of
power considerations, they cannot be considered here. It is, however, appropriate to suggest that they deserve re-examination because of the
significant changes in bargaining institutions and in appraisals of their
impact since the 1930's, when the governing premises of our national
labor policy were articulated.
The changes in, and clarification of, policy suggested here are extremely
limited. They support only legislation that would apply the Sherman
Act to direct restraints by unions on prices, production, and sales of employers' final products and that would, at the same time, make it clear
that collective bargaining over wages, hours, work loads and work sharing
are exempt from the Sherman Act. 8 5 The proposal is a corollary of
general antitrust policy as currently applied to employers; it would be
designed to prevent unions from serving as a shield and to provide an
enforcement mechanism for restrictions on product markets that have the
potential for securing monopoly benefits for employers. By dispensing
with any requirement of proving either actual monopoly benefits or concerted action by employer groups, that proposal would avoid difficult
issues of proof and would eliminate the formalistic distinction between
parallel and individual action adumbrated in Allen Bradley.
By itself, that proposal would not affect union power to restrain competition in the purchase of intermediate components by employers party
to such restrictive arrangements. Some restraints in that category are
subject to the NLRA, as amended, but the coverage of that statute is
limited and uncertain. Hence, the distinction between the two types of
market does not rest on the NLRA amendments, but on two other considerations: (1) the existence of employer incentive to resist restrictions
on their purchases; and (2) the difficulty of enforcing proscriptions of such
restrictions without regulating the total bargaining process.
The elimination of restraints in product markets would not affect the
substantial power of some unions to interfere with the efficient allocation
of resources by bargains confined to wages and other conditions of the
employment relait-io-nship. Those troubled by such power will understandably dismiss even the broadest legislation to promote open product markets as dealing with the symptoms, rather than the sources, of union
power.
The key difficulty for regulation is that a significant curtailment of
union -iler requires limitations on bargaining jurisdiction and that
such limitations presuppose both meaningful criteria for determining
the extent of power that unions should possess and methods for assessing
union power generally or in particular contexts. But it is precisely such
criteria and such methodology that seem to be lacking. Furthermore, there
185 See text accompanying notes 166-71 supra.
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is a lack of comprehensive data about the bargaining jurisdiction of
various unions. Without such criteria and data, radical surgery on the
union movement would appear to be a dangerous gamble with institutions that command stubborn loyalties and reflect important noneconomic
values.
These concluding observations suggest, first, that general antitrust proposals are not the answer to the problem of "excessive" union power and,
second, that the problem should be re-examined in the context of particular bargaining relationships and jurisdictional patterns. It would be
congenial to conclude with more affirmative and specific recommendations
or with a general endorsement of the existing structures of power. But
such a happy ending would involve either a disregard of what appear to
be serious power imbalances or a conscious disregard of the limits of
my own ignorance.

EPILOGUE

On June 7, 1965, long after this paper had been submitted for publi86
cation, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions below inPennington

and Jewel Tea.18 7 The Court split into three groups of three composed
of the same Justices in each case. One group consisting of Mr. Justice
White, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, held in
18
effect that the allegations in Pennington,
8 if established, made out a
violation by the union, whereas the findings below in Jewel Tea failed
to do so. A second group, consisting of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by
Justices Black and Clark, upheld the substantive claim of a violation by
the union in both cases. These two groups agreed, however, that the
union in Pennington was entitled to a new trial because of errors in
the instructions to the jury.18 9 The third group, consisting of Mr.
186 UMW v. Pennington, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585 (1965). The facts and issues of this case
were discussed in the text accompanying note 117, et seq., supra.
187 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Company, 85 Sup. Ct. 1596
(1965). The facts and issues of this case were discussed in the text accompanying note
126, et seq., supra.
188 In Pennington, Mr. Justice White's opinion is described as that of the Court.
That description is questionable in view of the fact that Mr. Justice Douglas' argument
for finding a violation emphasized considerations significantly different from those
stressed by Mr. Justice White. See text accompanying notes 212-13 infra.
189 Reversal was based on errors in the trial court's charge to the jury. One
such error had consisted of non-compliance with Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 865 U.S. 127 (1961), which the Court read as legalizing joint
efforts to influence a public official even though such efforts do not stand alone but are
part of a larger scheme violative of the Sherman Act. See UMW v. Pennington, 85
Sup. Ct. 1585 at 1593. For an alternative interpretation of Noerr, see note 118 supra.
Mr. Justice White's somewhat summary treatment of that case is perhaps explainable
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Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, rejected the
claim of violation in both cases. The composition of those groups is
interesting and should, incidentally, serve as a caution against simplistic
classifications of individual members of the Court. It may also be of
interest that a majority of the Court turned the suggestion in the main
paper' 90 on its head by condemning a bargain about wages on the
ground that it was actuated by predatory purposes while upholding a
market restriction on the ground that its purpose was limited to protecting the legitimate interests of employees.
I propose to examine the main themes in the three sets of opinions, to
relate them to the discussion in the principal paper, and to identify positions that now command the support of a majority of the Court.
In Pennington, the union, as already indicated, won the immediate
battle, but lost the war; for the Court imposed significant restrictions on
the use of collective bargaining to achieve either wage uniformity or
wage differentials within an industry. To be sure, Mr. Justice White, who
announced the judgment of the Court, acknowledged that "a union may
make wage agreements with a multi-employer bargaining unit and may
in pursuance of its own union interests seek to obtain the same terms
from other employers."' 91 But he immediately declared that that privilege was a conditional one:
A union forfeits its exemption from the anti-trust laws when
it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers
to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units. One
group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors
from the industry and the union is liable with the employers
192
if it becomes a party to the conspiracy.
Although Pennington involved charges of the predatory purposes referred to in the second sentence quoted above, Mr. Justice White's approach apparently did not require such purposes as a condition for
denying the labor exemption and finding a violation of the Sherman Act.
The "more basic defect," in his view, was an agreement between a
union and members of one bargaining unit that calls for the imposition
of a given structure of costs on firms outside that unit. 19 3 (In this paper
by his reliance on an independent error: the charge that had permitted recovery
of damages resulting from Walsh-Healy determinations by the Secretary of Labor.
Ibid.

190 See p. 690 supra.
191 85 Sup. Ct. at 1591.
192

(Emphasis supplied.) Ibid.

193

Id. at 1592.
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such agreements will sometimes be described as "extra-unit -agreements.")
Mr. Justice White urged that extra-unit agreements are not supported
by the national labor policy and are incompatible with the anti-trust
laws. His argument based on labor policy rested on the following
grounds. 94 The duty to bargain operates on a unit-by-unit basis, and
is, accordingly, inconsistent with bargaining in one unit concerning the
standards to govern another unit or the whole industry. A union would,
moreover, probably serve its members better by preserving its freedom
to adjust bargaining to the individual circumstances of each bargaining
unit. Finally, the Board has condemned the refusal of an employer to
recognize a union or to enter into an agreement with it until the union
organizes or secures similar agreements from the employer's competitors.195

Mr. Justice White's argument against extra-unit bargaining based on
labor policy involves serious difficulties. The Justice implied that members of the Court are better judges of the interests of the union constituency than the union itself and, by ignoring the realities of collective bargaining, immediately raised doubts about that proposition. Thus
a familiar obstacle to concessions by employers in a given bargaining
unit is the fear that competitors may secure a better bargain or one that
will exert "undue pressure" on the competitive position of the employers
engaged in prior negotiations. That fear may be overcome in a variety
of ways: by the union's established policy in favor of uniformity or historic differentials; by union assurances in the initial negotiations; or by
the organization of multiemployer bargaining units. Mr. Justice White
appears to have given decisive effect to the form by which such assurances are given. More important, he ignores that the interests of the
extra-unit employees are often profoundly affected by the patterns or
comparisons established by prior bargains. The union's limitation of its
freedom with respect to future bargaining thus does not necessarily involve any injury to the employees whose interests will be involved in
such bargaining. On the contrary, those employees may benefit from
employer concessions previously secured with the help of limitations on
the union's freedom in future bargaining.
Where, as in the Pennington case, such limitations advance a policy
of wage uniformity, there are special and deep-seated reasons for questioning Mr. Justice Wrhite's blanket condemnation of extra-unit agreements. Thus, a classic objective of the union movement has been "to
194 See id. at 1591 for the development of his argument.

195 See American Range Lines, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 139, 147 (1939), cited, inter alia,
85 Sup. Ct. at 1591.
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take competition out of wages" by extending the scope of organization
and by imposing uniform labor standards on competitors. The preamble to the NLRA seems, moreover, to have endorsed that objective
by recognizing the desirability of promoting, through union organization, "the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries."' 19 6 As Mr. Justice Goldberg
charged, 97 Mr. Justice White's approach appears to have ignored the
realities of bargaining, the history of the union movement, and an important purpose of the national labor policy.
Equally vulnerable was his reliance on NLRB decisions proscribing
employer insistence on demands that the terms bargained for, or agreed
to, with respect to one unit should either be imposed on another unit or
should be suspended. That reliance was, as Mr. Justice Goldberg argued, 198 misplaced because demands that the NLRA forbids a proponent to press may, nevertheless, be proposed and voluntarily accepted by
the other party, without any violation of that statute.
The foregoing difficulties with his argument from labor policy may
have moved Mr. Justice White to attach primary importance to the antitrust laws as a basis for condemning extra-unit bargaining. His antitrust argument went like this. 99 One group of employers could not
lawfully demand that the union impose on other employers (presumably
competitors) wage costs significantly higher than those granted by the
first group. The anti-competitive thrusts of such demands are obvious
and no different in purpose and effect from the conspiracy alleged in
Pennington-the elimination of marginal employers. But predatory purposes were not a prerequisite for condemning such extra-unit bargaining; its basic defects, as indicated above, consisted of its limitation on
the union's freedom of action in future bargaining and its binding the
union's interest to that of the favored employers. Such restraints on the
freedom of economic units to act according to their own choice run
counter to antitrust policy.
Mr. Justice White was silent about objections to his position that were
forcefully presented in Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion. 20° Thus, section
6 of the Clayton Act201 appears to exempt from the Sherman Act col1906 See Section 1 of NLRA, as amended, 49 Stat. 449, as amended by 61 Stat. 136,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1965).
197 See 85 Sup. Ct. 1617-22.
198 Id. at 1622 n.25.
199 Id. at 1591.
200

Id. at 1614.

201 "That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
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lective bargaining agreements covering only wages and other "conventional terms"; nor is there anything in that section that warrants a withdrawal of that exemption from extra-unit agreements. Such a withdrawal
appears, moreover, to run counter to important elements of the antitrust
laws, interlaced, as they are, with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. First, the
broad definition of a labor dispute in section 13 of the Norris-La
Guardia Act2 02 recognizes the interest of both unions and employers in
the labor standards operative in other bargaining units. Second, the
celebrated immunity proclaimed in Hutcheson =° is incompatible with a
blanket condemnation of extra-unit agreements. Similarly, the recognition in Apex 2o4 that the antitrust laws do not prohibit unions from eliminating price competition based on differences in labor standards implies that that objective may be pursued by such agreements.
In addition, union consent to multi-employer bargaining involves a
surrender by the union of its freedom of action vis-4-vis the firms composing such a unit and a reciprocal surrender by those firms. To be sure,
that surrender affects only a single bargaining unit appropriate under
the NLRA and is, accordingly, formally consistent with Mr. Justice
White's effort to safeguard unit-by-unit bargaining. But the endorsement
of multiemployer bargaining indicates that the national policy has, at
least in one context, made other objectives paramount over individuated
adjustment to the varying conditions of different firms. That endorsement is, moreover, particularly significant because multiemployer bargaining involves special dangers that unified labor policies will lead to
unified pricing policies. It is thus not clear why a union is able lawfully to surrender its freedom of action by consenting to an industry-wide
bargaining unit and yet is subject to an automatic loss of exemption if
it enters into an extra-unit agreement.
The condition engrafted on labor's exemption by Mr. Justice White
thus appears to have ignored two fundamental aspects of antitrust
policy as applied to unions. First, that policy has tolerated their accumulation and vigorous exercise of monopoly power and the resultant restraints on choices by individual economic units, both employees and
employers. Second, it has tolerated the imposition of uniform rates on
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the anti-trust laws."
47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1964).
See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
204 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940), discussed in text
accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
202
203
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competitors whatever the differences in their labor markets-the union
aside. Those ingredients of national policy involve far greater dangers
to a competitive order than does extra-unit bargaining. The blanket condemnation of such bargaining, accordingly, reflects a lack of proportion.
It suggests that the law, having swallowed an anti-competitive whale, was
gagging at what, at best, was a minnow.

20 5

The formidable legal and functional objections to a blanket condemnation of extra-unit agreements manifestly called for a clear-cut statement of why they were repugnant to antitrust policy. Furthermore, the
balancing approach adopted by Mr. Justice White in Jewel Tea2°6 called
for a weighing of those objections and the union interests that they reflected against such anti-competitive results as were brought about by
extra-unit agreements. But Mr. Justice White in Pennington did not seek
to identify and weigh these conflicting interests. He offered only a remote
and unsatisfying generality: the union's surrender of its freedom was
like "other restraints upon the freedom of economic units to act according to their own choice ... that run counter to anti-trust policy."207 But
that generality ignored that any agreement involves a restraint on freedom
of choice and that "labor's" exemption means that collective agreements
are presumptively different from restrictions that firms impose on their
own freedom of action.
To be sure, the Justice was able to muster a citation to one case that
involved labor relations, if not unions, namely, Anderson v. Shipowners'
Ass'n.208 But the applicability of that case is far from dear. In Anderson,
the Court upheld the sufficiency, under the Sherman Act, of a complaint
setting forth the following allegations. Members of an association, controlling virtually all merchant vessels on the Pacific Coast, had combined
to control employment on those vessels by fixing wages, requiring association clearance of seamen as a condition of their employment and by
assigning them to particular jobs. That arrangement had divested individual employers of control over the selection of their personnel and
205 Mr. Justice White's approach also raises questions about the validity of arrangements for a common bargaining policy by different unions representing different
bargaining units within the same enterprise. If two such unions agree that each
of them will demand a specified wage increase, their agreement would be incompatible with unit-by-unit bargaining. Perhaps such agreements would be distinguished
from those involved in Pennington on the ground that they are not directed at imposing specified labor standards on competitors constituting separate bargaining units.
For a discussion of inter-union agreements, see generally Trade Union Alliances for
Collective Bargaining, in Monthly Lab. Rev., May, 1965, p. III.
206 See text accompanying note 223 infra.
207 85 Sup. Ct. at 1592.
208 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
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had deprived the plaintiff, who had been denied clearance, of employment.
The Court there emphasized that the basic vice in that arrangement
was that "each of the shipowners and operators, by entering into this
combination, has, in respect of the employment of seamen, surrendered
himself completely to the control of the associations." 20 9 Without mentioning section 6 of the Clayton Act, 210 the Court also declared that
"ships and those who operate them are instrumentalities of commerce."'211 It found that the effect of the combination was to limit "the
freedom to trade" of both the seamen and the owners. Accordingly, "it
was not important.., to inquire... whether the object of the combination was to regulate the employment of men and not to restrain com212
merce."
Despite the similarity of the Court's language in Anderson and that
of Mr. Justice White's in Pennington, there are significant differences in
the two situations. Thus, Anderson did not involve collective bargaining
but only a unilateral arrangement established by the association. Accordingly, there was no room for the argument that immunity from the
Sherman Act was necessary to achieve the basic purpose of section 6 and
section 20 of the Clayton Act (later expanded by Norris-LaGuardia)the safeguarding of conventional collective bargaining from antitrust
liability. Arrangements such as those involved in Anderson were, moreover, an obvious vehicle for an anti-union blacdist. Finally, postAnderson developments raise questions about the current applicability
of Anderson to restrictions on union or employer freedom of action.
Thus, the legalization of multiemployer bargaining and of hiring halls
makes it clear that there is no basis for drawing from the Sherman Act
a general condemnation in the context of labor relations of "restraints
upon the freedom of economic units to act according to their own choice
213
and discretion."
The difficulties with respect to both the rationale for, and the results
of, a broad proscription of extra-unit agreements may lead to its being
confined to situations that also involve a "conspiracy" to eliminate
competitors. Since Pennington involved such a conspiracy, Mr. Justice
White's more expansive approach may be dismissed as dicta. More
important, none of the other opinions in Pennington adopted his broad
approach. Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion rested explicitly on the
209 Id.
210
211

at 362.

Quoted in note 201 supra.
272 U.S. at 363.

212 Ibid.
213

See 85 Sup. Ct. at 1592.
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existence of a predatory purpose. He "read the opinion of the Court"
as advising the trial judge to give the following instruction, among
others, to the jury in the new trial:
[1]f there [was] an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement whereby employers and the union agreed on a wage scale
that exceeded the financial ability of some operators to pay
and... if it was made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of business, the union as well as the employers who participate in the arrangement with the union should be found
214
to have violated the anti-trust laws.
That instruction, it is worth noting, is indifferent to the formal scope
of the bargaining unit through which the condemned agreement was
secured, and indicates that it is immaterial whether the condemned
agreements were the product of joint or successive negotiations. 215 Mr.
Justice Goldberg's opinion would, as indicated below, have given
the Sherman Act the narrowest possible scope in relation to collective
bargaining. Hence, Mr. Justice White's preoccupation with extra-unit
bargaining and his resultant refusal to make predatory purposes a prerequisite for a violation plainly do not now have the support of a
majority of the Court. Mr. Justice White's opinion in Pennington does
not, moreover, make it clear whether pursuit of a predatory purpose
directed against some firms within a multiemployer unit by bargaining
confined to that unit would make out a violation. Nevertheless, his
opinion in Jewel Tea appears to resolve that ambiguity in favor of
finding a violation, by emphasizing that exemption does not necessarily
extend to bargaining between a union and a single employer.21 6
214 Id. at 1595. The Justice stated that the Court's opinion called also for this
instruction: "[A]n industry-wide agreement containing these features is prima facie
evidence of a violation." Ibid. (Presumably, the Justice was not using "containing"
literally.) There are two uncertainties raised by this instruction: (1)If it is established
that an industry-wide agreement had been accompanied by arrangements with the
features described in the first instruction quoted in the text, presumably a violation,
as distinguished from "prima facie evidence" thereof, has been made out. (2) It is
doubtful that "industry-wide agreement" is used literally; presumably, it means an
agreement that in fact covers a substantial part of the industry or that the union and
the participating employers wish to extend to all, or a substantial part of, the
industry.
The instructions suggested by the Justice were directed at wage bargaining and
did not expressly deal with the boycott provisions of the collective agreements or
with the UMW's control over several companies. Nevertheless the Justice later referred
to the latter items (id. at 4524-25) without, however, indicating that they were significant beyond their bearing on the issue of purpose. But cf. note 119 supra.
215 In a footnote the Justice made it clear that "conscious parallelism" is to be
applied to collective bargaining. See the material preceded by an asterisk, after n.5,
85 Sup. Ct. at 1595.
216 See 85 Sup. Ct. at 1602.
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Violations that turn on the existence of particular "purposes" or
,'motives" in collective bargaining confront triers of fact with slippery
evidentiary issues and, as a corollary, place collective bargaining under
a Damodean sword. We will later refer to Mr. Justice Goldberg's
forceful objections to those difficulties and to the disingenuous bargaining tactics they are likely to generate.
It is, however, important to note that the two cases show that purposes operate not only to condemn, but also to validate collective bargaining agreements. In Pennington, a majority of the Court was prepared to condemn collective bargaining that, on the surface, went to
the core of mandatory bargaining, on the ground that such bargaining
was actuated by improper purposes. By contrast, in Jewel Tea, Mr.
Justice White and the two Justices concurring with him (all of whom
were necessary for a majority) upheld what was on its face a marketing
restriction by a group of employers which concededly restrained their
sales on the ground that the disputed restriction was free from any
predatory purpose and was independently pressed in good faith by the
union to protect its legitimatp interests. Before examining the reasoning
by which Mr. Justice White upheld the disputed restriction in Jewel
Tea, a word about his disposition of the union's challenge to judicial
competence is in order.
The union had contended that the Nk.RB's primary jurisdiction
over the controversy should have been recognized and that judicial
determination should have been deferred until the Board had decided
whether the disputed restriction was to be characterized as "a term or
condition of employment." In rejecting that contention-a point on
which the Court was unanimous217 -Mr. Justice White relied on the
following consideration. Courts had gained experience with such characterizations in applying the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which defines
"labor dispute" as including "any controversy concerning terms and
conditions of employment." Furthermore, Pennington had indicated
that prior administrative adjudication would not have been warranted
by its potential contribution to the disposition of the antitrust issues;
for Pennington had made clear that a collective bargaining agreement
dealing with the wages to be imposed on other employers are not necessarily exempt from the antitrust laws even though wages are plainly at
the core of mandatory bargaining. Similarly, in Jewel Tea, if the allegation of a union-employers' conspiracy to impose the marketing restriction on Jewel had been established, the union would not have been
217 Mr. Justice Goldberg, although rejecting the basic approach of Mr. Justice
White's opinions, noted his agreement with the Court that primary jurisdiction did
not apply to these cases. 85 Sup. Ct. at 1614 n.18.
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exempt-regardless of how the Board would have characterized that restriction. Consequently, at the beginning of the litigation in Jewel Tea,
when a determination to refer the matter to the Board would have been
in order, the Board's characterization would have been of subsidiary
importance at best. Finally, Mr. Justice White argued that in some
circumstances there is no procedure for securing a Board determina21 8
tion.
Although, as indicated in the principal paper, 219 the rejection of primary jurisdiction in Jewel Tea and Pennington is, in my view, sound,
the reasons for this result advanced in Mr. Justice White's opinion are
not free from difficulty. Thus, his reference to judicial experience with
the classification problem under Norris-LaGuardia ignores that the
situations involved were not cognizable by an administrative agency.220
Independent judicial action in those situations did not, accordingly,
raise questions about the value of uniformity and administrative expertise that underly the preemption doctrine in labor relations. Furthermore, the reference to Pennington implies that the agreement there alleged, to impose particular terms on firms outside the bargaining unit,
was a mandatory item of bargaining. But the Board precedents invoked
by Mr. Justice White22 ' and the whole thrust of his opinion point in
the opposite direction. Finally, the emphasis on the unavailability, in
some cases, of an administrative mechanism ignores the particular facts
of Jewel Tea. Jewel had acquiesced in the marketing restriction only
after a strike threat and therefore could have filed a non-frivolous charge
with the Board. It is true that Jewel would have been faced with the
NLR.A's short limitation period; but if primary jurisdiction were otherwise desirable, the dilatoriness of a litigant would be a doubtful basis
for dispensing with that requirement. It is also true that the General
Counsel could have blocked access to the Board's machinery. But in
view of the presumption of official regularity, his denial of a complaint
(where the Board's jurisdictional yardsticks had been satisfied) could
have been accepted as the equivalent of a Board determination that the
218 The Board would be unavailable (a) where agreement to a provision attacked
under the Sherman Act had been reached without insistent bargaining or the
application of economic pressure even though that provision related to a non-mandatory item of bargaining; (b) where the Board's general counsel refuses to issue a
complaint on an unfair labor practice charge based on allegations that also serve
as a basis for attack under the Sherman Act; and (c) where the six months' limitation
period prescribed by the NLRA, as amended, would bar the processing of a charge.
219

See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.

See, e.g., Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S.
330 (1960) and Bakery Sales Drivers Local v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1947), cited in
85 Sup. Ct. at 1600.
221 See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
220
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charge of a refusal to bargain lacked substance. Indeed, as a footnote in
Mr. Justice White's opinion intimated, 22 his concern with possible
obstructions to the Board's machinery contrasted with the Court's denial
of state competence over cases within the Board's theoretical jurisdiction
despite the Board's declination, as a matter of policy, to handle such
cases.
On the merits, Mr. Justice White, while upholding the exemption
for the market restriction, declined to recognize an expansive exemption
for collective bargaining. With reference to the contrary implications
of Hutcheson 38 and Allen Bradley,224 he announced, as already indicated,

that even agreements between a union and a single employer were not
necessarily exempt, e.g., when they reached into areas of non-mandatory
bargaining. 225 He characterized a hypothetical union demand on Jewel
that it adhere to a price schedule for its meats as non-mandatory; consequently, a union-employer agreement with respect to such prices
would probably fall outside the exemption although it would not necessarily constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. On the other hand,
when agreements were restricted to mandatory items, that fact weighed
heavily in favor of an antitrust exemption. But the scope of that exemption was not co-extensive with the area of mandatory bargaining. Characterization of the subjects of agreement as mandatory appears, in other
words, to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of exemption.
Whether any particular demand is exempt depends on weighing the
interest in competition against the competing interests of the employ22 6

ees.

The general approach described above shaped, without however controlling, Mr. Justice White's formulation of the question that Jewel Tea
presented to the Court:
whether the marketing hour restriction, like wages, and unlike
prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours, and working
conditions that the union's successful attempt to obtain that
provision through bonafide arms-length bargaining in pursuit
of its own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in
combination with non-labor groups, falls wvithin the protection
of the national labor policy and is, therefore, exempt from the
227
Sherman Act.

222 See 85 Sup. Ct. 1601 nA. The no-man's land has been eliminated by §
14(c) of the NLRA, as amended in 1959.

223
224

See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
See text accompanying note 50 supra.

225

See 85 -Sp.Ct. at 1602.

226

Ibid. at note 5, quoted in text accompanying note 232 infra.
Emphasis supplied. See 85 Sup. Ct. at 1602.
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That formulation, it may be noted, appeared to depart from the balancing approach; for it emphasized the union's interests but was wholly
silent about the competing interest in competition in the product market. Furthermore, that formulation, in negativing any combination of
non-labor groups, ignored that the marketing restriction had not only
been the product of group bargaining but also was the kind of restriction that one firm was unlikely to accept without assurance that its
228
competitors would also be bound.
In resolving that issue in favor of exemption, Mr. Justice White first
rejected the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the time when work was
to be done was a managerial prerogative. The Justice recognized that
agreements regulating the time of work have "an effect on competition,
both apparent and real, perhaps more so than in the case of the wage
agreement." 229 But "the concern of union members is immediate and
direct. Weighing the respective interests involved, we think the national
labor policy places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees must
work." 23 0 That conclusion with respect to the time of work, read literally,

was not confined to the Jewel Tea case and is likely to be read as having
general applicability. But such an interpretation presupposes that the relative weight to employee and competitive interests is the same, regardless
of the character of the provision with respect to the time of work. The
weighing process is so elusive that it is not easy to come to grips with
that proposition. Nevertheless, some provisions, e.g., one that employees
shall not work for three months and shall not be replaced, might well
fall outside the exemption. Such provisions might be viewed functionally as a scheme for production control and different weights might,
accordingly, be ascribed to the competing interests at stake.2 31 Mr.
Justice White had, after all, declared: "the crucial determinant is not
the form of agreement-e.g., prices or wages-but its relative impact
on the product market and the interests of union members." 232
Having rejected the Seventh Circuit's unnecessary and unsound characterization of the time when work is to be done, Mr. Justice 'White
228 In his formulation of the issue in Jewel Tea, Mr. Justice White completely
ignored the trial court's finding that the collective bargaining agreement also provided
that "the unions agree not to enter into a contract with any other employer designating
lower wages, or longer hours, or any more favorable conditions of employment." See
215 F. Supp. at 842. That omission is striking in view of the Justice's emphasis on
extra-unit agreements in Pennington.
220 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
231 Cf. Penello v. UMW, 88 F. Supp. 935, 941 (D.D.C. 1950).
232 85 Sup. Ct. at 1602 n.5.
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turned to the issue at hand: whether the restriction on marketing, as
distinguished from working, hours was within the labor exemption.
The decisive factor for him was the trial court's finding, apparently undisturbed on appeal, that night sales were impractical without butchers
and that such sales would result in an encroachment on their work
jurisdiction and an increase in their work load.233 That finding served
as the basis for the conclusion that marketing hours, like working hours,
constituted "a subject of immediate and legitimate concern to union
members." 234 But, under Mr. Justice White's balancing test, that conclusion did not necessarily warrant an exemption for the disputed provision; for that test required consideration of the "relative impact" of
that provision on the product market and the interests of union members (or employees). Although Mr. Justice White had, albeit somewhat
generally, focused on the competing interests implicated by clauses
regulating the time of work, he examined only the union side of the
scale in considering the restriction on marketing hours, the only clause
before him. Furthermore, he appeared to assume that the employees'
interests served by restrictions on the time of work and the marketing
restrictions were identical. But such an assumption is extremely dubious.
As indicated in the main paper, 23 5 the increase in the butchers' work
load, which seemed insubstantial at best, could have been dealt with
by other clauses. Similarly, the potential encroachment on work jurisdiction appeared to be slight even if Jewel's willingness to contract
against such encroachment were ignored. More important, an employee's interest in avoiding night work for himself is quite different
from his interest in barring others from performing tasks peripheral to
his principal jurisdiction at a time when he declines to work. Furthermore, even if the butchers had been willing to perform such peripheral
work at night, a strike, actual or threatened, to obtain its assignment
would run counter to section 8(b)(4)(D) or would, at least, raise a sub233 The Seventh Circuit, because of its unduly broad approach, did not pass
specifically on that finding. Nevertheless, that court did make a general finding that
the material allegations of the complaint had been sustained by the record. See Jewel
Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, 31 F.2d 547, 548 (7th Cir.
1964). Paragraph 11 of the complaint had alleged that night sales were feasible without
the presence of butchers and that such incidental tasks as stocking the self-service
containers could be performed by others or could be performed by butchers prior
to their leaving. See Record, p. 20, Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1596 (1965). The conflict between the general finding of the reviewing
court and the specific finding of the trial court was not mentioned in any of the
opinions by members of the Court.
234 85 Sup. Ct. at 1603.
235

See note 129 supra.

1965]

LABOR UNIONS AND ANTITRUST

stantial question under that section.2 6 To be sure, the initial enforcement of that section devolves on the Board; but courts, although similarly preempted with respect to sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), are, under
Mr. Justice White's approach, to take account of those sections and
generally to accommodate antitrust and labor policy in applying the
Sherman Act. Such accommodation would seem also to call for consideration of the legitimacy under section 8(b)(4)(D) of the union's effort
by economic pressure to prevent other employees from performing work
at a time when employees represented by the union are unwilling to
work.
There are thus difficulties with Mr. Justice White's ultimate conclusion even if the trial court's finding of the inevitability of jurisdictional
encroachment is accepted. The Justice, moreover, recognized that that
23 7
finding, although not "dearly erroneous," was scarcely inexorable.
It is, accordingly, unfortunate that the Seventh Circuit, because of its
unduly broad approach to the case, had failed to pass specifically on the
finding that Mr. Justice White found to be decisive. Nevertheless, as
already indicated, 238 that court's general finding that the material allegations of the complaint had been established could be read as rejecting the trial court's finding. In view of the unsatisfactory review by the
Seventh Circuit, the questionable nature of the underlying evidence,
the partial rejection of the trial court's finding by the dissenters in
Jewel Tea,239 and the public interest involved, a remand to the Seventh

Circuit to secure its views and, if necessary, to permit the taking of
additional evidence would have been desirable.
Mr. Justice Douglas' brief dissenting opinion in Jewel Tea rested on
Allen Bradley and thereby avoided the obvious difficulties of applying
the balancing test to the disputed provision. His argument for the applicability of Allen Bradley was simplicity itself: the disputed provision
had restricted competition in the marketing of goods and services and
was no different from price-fixing. The dissent ignored, moreover, the
undisturbed finding that there had been no subsidiary conspiracy between the unions and some employers to impose the marketing restric236 Although the NLRB has generally required for a violation of section 8(b)(4)(D)
that at least two groups of employees be actively competing for the same work, that
requirement is not an inflexible one. See Longshoreman's Union, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 69
(May 18, 1965), 59 LRRM 1152. Hence, the absence of evidence that employees,
other than the butchers, wished to restock the self-service units would not be decisive
on the issue of whether that section had been violated.
237 See 85 Sup. Ct. at 1604-06.
238 See note 233 supra.
239 See text accompanying note 241 infra.
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tion on Jewel. It was, accordingly, easy to conclude that under Allen
Bradley "the unions can no more aid a group of business men to force
their competitors to follow uniform store marketing hours than to force
them to sell at fixed prices."' 40
Mr. Justice Douglas and his colleagues in dissent dismissed or passed
over the countervailing considerations urged by Mr. Justice White as
justification for the restraint on marketing. They asserted that his conclusion that the concern of the union members over marketing hours
is immediate and direct depended upon the existence of a necessary
connection between marketing hours and working hours. They rejected
the conclusion as to the immediacy of the union concern on the ground
that the undisputed evidence showed that, without night-time butchers,
there had been night sales of meat in Indiana and of fresh poultry and
sausage in Chicago. 241 Since the broad approach of Mr. Justice Goldberg and the two Justices joining in his opinion made it unnecessary for
them to pass on the factual predicate for the conclusion that the union's
interest in operating hours was immediate and direct, only three members of the Court accepted the factual finding that was the critical factor
in reversal.
As indicated in the principal paper, Mr. Justice Douglas placed his
finger on the heart of the controversy by stressing the difficulty of distinguishing price fixing from other forms of market control, including
the one involved in Jewel Tea. His supporting argument is, however,
less appealing, in my opinion, than his ultimate conclusion, for three
reasons: first, his summary reliance on a case as elusive as Allen Bradley; second, his disregard of factual findings that raised questions about
the applicability of that case; and, finally, his failure to indicate whether
the acceptance of Mr. Justice White's conclusion with respect to the
union's direct and immediate interest in the market restriction would
have called for the upholding of that restriction. In connection with
the last point, it is worth noting that Mr. Justice Douglas' failure in
Jewel Tea squarely to consider the significance of the union's purpose
involves a sharp contrast with the decisive effect he attached to the
union's purpose in Pennington. If, as seems to be the case, the Justice
would ascribe different significance to the union's purposes in the two
situations, the difference presumably depends on whether a market re240 85 Sup. Ct. at 1607.
241 Ibid. The dissenters were silent about the related finding that such sales would
infringe on the butchers' work jurisdiction. The dissenters did, however, notice the
union's alternative contention that night self-service would place some stores at a
competitive disadvantage and would generate pressure for night work by butchers at
stores lacking self-service facilities. They summarily dismissed that contention as
involving an expansive labor exemption wholly incompatible with Allen Bradley.
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striction, rather than a restriction on wages, hours or other aspects of
the employment relationship, is involved.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart in
a sweeping and lengthy opinion, vigorously attacked the approaches
adopted by his brethren in both cases. He began with a lengthy historical essay about the application of the Sherman Act to union activities and the development of labor legislation. His essay was an instrument of advocacy rather than of inquiry; 242 it was designed to show,
not the complexity of the problem, but the simplicity of the solution.
With that essay as a foundation, he recurred to two themes throughout
his opinion. First, his brethren would turn the clock back to the preHutcheson era when courts condemned conventional collective bargaining on the basis of their own social and economic predilections. 243
Second, his brethren had ignored the congressional intent by refusing
to accord to collective bargaining an exemption from the Sherman Act
co-extensive with the area of mandatory bargaining. 244 It is convenient
to deal with his argument case by case and thereafter to return to his
larger themes.
As to Pennington, his rejection of the approaches in the two competing opinions rested on the following grounds: the antitrust laws
do not proscribe, and the national labor policy affirmatively promotes,
wage uniformity throughout an industry.24 5 Although Mr. Justice
White had recognized that such uniformity is a proper objective, his
proposed withdrawal of exemption from extra-unit agreements would
impede such uniformity and would seriously inhibit free discussion in
the bargaining room. 246 Bargaining frequently involves employer re242 That essay is open to the following general criticisms: it ignores that in the
pre-Hutcheson period the Supreme Court cases that applied the Sherman Act to
union activities dealt primarily with union efforts to secure or to extend organization.
See cases cited in notes 11-13 supra. The repudiation of those cases on the basis of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act tells us very little about the limits imposed by the antitrust
laws on collective bargaining agreements that appear to be directed at restraining
competition in product markets or about how the lines between the labor market and
the product market are to be drawn. Those questions, as Allen Bradley made clear,
were not answered by the Wagner Act or by the Hutcheson case. Indeed, those questions were sharpened by the legislative protection accorded to, union activities and
the growth of union power. Nor are answers to be found in the proscriptions of
"specific" union activities embodied in the amendments to the NLRA-uness one
draws from those amendments a partial repeal of the Sherman Act. The Justice,
although apparently tempted to find such a repeal, in the end properly resisted that
temptation. The tangled history thus scarcely provides support for the particular
solution urged by the Justice.
243 See 85 Sup. Ct. at 1617-19.
244 Id. at 1614.
245 Id. at 1616.
246 Id. at 1617-18.
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liance on competitive conditions as a justification for rejecting union
demands. But such talk by the employer, coupled with subsequent union
action directed at other bargaining units, might become the basis for
inferring a union-employer agreement that the union would impose
particular standards on other employers. Inquiry as to whether such
an agreement existed would inescapably confront elusive issues as to
the purposes and motives attending negotiations. Such inquiry would
also lead to a substitution of judicial for congressional judgment as to
how collective bargaining should work-a substitution that would
ignore the judicial ineptitude in regulating collective bargaining reflected in the pre-Hutcheson era.247 Thus, in Pennington, the conten-

tion that wage rates were set high so as to drive out the weaker firms
invited the trier to find an unlawful or a non-exempt agreement on the
basis of his judgment as to a proper wage rate. His brethren's approaches would also invite disingenuous bargaining and unnecessary
economic warfare. Thus, to reduce the possibility of meritorious charges
of predatory or extra-unit agreements, employers would make a show
of resistance to union demands, and unions would seek to establish the
arms length nature of the bargaining by resorting to strikes. Finally, the
Court's approach would make antitrust liability turn on an irrelevant
consideration, that is, whether multiemployer or pattern bargaining
had been used to achieve standardized rates. We may dispose of this
point at once by noting that Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion plainly did
not give decisive weight to the scope of the bargaining unit and that
Mr. Justice White's opinion is open to the same interpretation.248 We
will return to the other points made by Mr. Justice Goldberg in Pennington after describing the principal elements of his argument in
Jewel Tea.
He urged the following objections against Mr. Justice White's opinion. It denied to collective bargaining an exemption from the antitrust laws that would be co-extensive with the area of mandatory bargaining. Its suggestion that the labor exemption would have been
inoperable if night sales had not infringed on the butchers' interest in
work loads and jurisdiction reflected an unduly narrow view of the area
of legitimate union concern 249 interposed by Allen Bradley to such a
purposeful attack on competition in the product market. To meet the
obstacles interposed by Allen Bradley, Mr. Justice Goldberg resorted to
labels and to a somewhat disingenuous summary of that case. He de247 Id. at 1618.

248 See text accompanying notes 211-13 supra.
249 Id. at 1624. The union interests deemed by the Justice sufficient to warrant the

market restriction are described in note 237 supra.
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clared: "The direct interest of the union in not working undesirable
hours by curtailing all business at those hours is, of course, a far cry
from the indirect 'interest' in Allen Bradley in fixing prices and allocating markets solely to increase the profits of favored employers."250
As my principal paper indicated, 251 Mr. Justice Goldberg is, in my
opinion, on sound ground in stressing the difficulties that result from
giving decisive effect to motive or purpose as a basis for denying exemption to collective bargains covering wages and other matters at the core
of mandatory bargaining. But I must express a contrary judgment about
his suggestion that labor's exemption from the antitrust laws should
be co-extensive with the area of mandatory bargaining. The principal
paper pointed to the difficulties raised by that suggestion, 252 and I find
no answer to them in the Justice's opinion. His reliance on that plastic
perennial, the intent of Congress, is not even supported by a single
reference to a statutory provision or to the legislative history of the
NLRA, as amended. Furthermore, although it is, as indicated below,
difficult to spell out the impact of his formula, its acceptance would
probably not curtail line-drawing based on explicit or unvoiced value
choices; it would merely shift the rubric under which such choices were
made from the antitrust laws to the provisions of the NLRA that delineate the area of mandatory bargaining.
Several considerations may illuminate the consequences and the complications implicit in the Justice's formula. It will be recalled that he
did not dissent from the rejection of primary jurisdiction when collective bargaining agreements are challenged under the antitrust laws.
Consequently, issues as to the scope of the antitrust exemption in that
context would be independently determined by the courts. With respect to such determinations, it would be undesirable, if not bizarre, to
conclude that NLRB precedents as to the area of mandatory bargaining bind the courts under the Sherman Act. Such an approach would
have much in common with the primary jurisdiction approach unanimously rejected by the Court. Moreover, and more important, the
250

(Emphasis supplied.) 85 Sup. Ct. at 1624. Earlier the Justice in discussing Allen

Bradley (1) had supported his characterization of the union's interest in the firms'

monopoly profits as "indirect" on the ground that there was only a possibility of
those profits trickling down to the employees, and (2) had also emphasized that the
union had joined a combination of employers. Id. at 1612. Given the union's power
in Allen Bradley and the link between its wage demands and price-fixing schemes,

the first item of the Justice's summary appears to have overstated the contingent nature
of the employees' benefits. Furthermore, the second item adopts the fiction by which
the union in Allen Bradley was transformed from an active architect of the combination into an accessory after the fact. See notes 66-67 supra.
251 See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
252 See text accompanying notes 136-145 supra.
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NLRB precedents have been directed at different purposes from those
behind the antitrust laws. 253 The NLRB not only lacks any special
competence with respect to those laws but has not, in general, taken
account of them in delineating the area of mandatory bargaining. Indeed, the expansiveness of that area may be explainable in part on the
ground that it has been marked out without explicit concern for any
radiating effects on immunity from the Sherman Act.2 54 Under such
circumstances, to invoke NLRB precedents as the touchstone for resolving antitrust issues would involve the most mechanical kind of juris2 55
prudence.
Where antitrust proceedings involved agreements whose status as
mandatory or non-mandatory items was, uncertain under Board precedents, the value choices confronting the courts would not be materially affected by resort to the Justice's formula. An examination of
the problems involved in applying that formula to Allen Bradley and
Jewel Tea will, in my opinion, support this point.
In Allen Bradley, the union's program advanced its legitimate interests-job security and higher pay for the employees' involved, coupled with an expansion of union jurisdiction. The resulting monopoly
benefits to the firms (contrary to Mr. Justice Goldberg's implication)
were not ends in themselves but means to promote the union's interests.
Indeed, the connection between the benefits to the 'firms and to their
employees moved the highly respected Second Circuit,2 56 as well as one
member of the Supreme Court, 257 to immunize both parties to the pro-

gram of cooperative monopoly from the Sherman Act. Plainly, the underlying issue would not have been different in substance or easier to
resolve if it had then been presented or were presented prior to the instant cases, as an issue concerning the scope of mandatory bargaining
rather than an issue as to the coverage of the Sherman Act.
An examination of Jewel Tea leads to the same conclusion. The em255 See text accompanying, and following immediately after, note 137 supra.
254 Thus, in Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959), the Court in characterizing
the disputed provisions as items of mandatory bargaining as a basis for preempting
the state antitrust laws cited Allen Bradley and carefully noted that "federal law sets
some outside limits (not intended to be exceeded here) on what [the parties'] agreement may provide."

255 Mr. Justice Goldberg's reliance on the assumed classification of the disputed
clause as a mandatory item was in sharp contrast to his insistence, in Los Angeles Meat,
that the Court, in administering the Sherman Act, should not be bound by classification of groups as "independent contractors" under the NLRA, as amended. See text
accompanying and immediately following notes 103-08 supra. See also 371 U.S. at 107
for his criticism of "mechanically affixing naked labels imported from other concepts."
256 See 145 F.2d at 220, 224-25.
257 See note 67 supra.
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ployee interests that the trial court found would be invaded by night
operations were insubstantial, and of questionable legitimacy, under
section 8(b)(4)(D). So long as night work by butchers was not directly
required, the issue as to the status of the marketing restriction might
have been resolved by characterizing operating, as distinguished from
working, hours as falling outside the mandatory area. That characterization would have been even easier to defend if the union's only interest
in the marketing restriction was its desire to insulate the independents
and their butchers against the pressure to stay open generated by night
self-service sales or against the high cost of night operations. As indicated in the principal paper,2 58 such pressures merely indicate that
competition in product markets may adversely affect some firms and
their employees. The existence of such pressures tells us nothing about
the extent to which collective bargaining may lawfully restrain product
competition in order to protect concededly legitimate employee interests. Nor does Mr. Justice Goldberg's formula tell us why the market restriction in Jewel. should be validated although price-fixing by
way of collective bargaining should be denied exemption. The difficulties are, moreover, not overcome by characterizing the market restriction as "directly related" to the employees' interests but price-fixing
as "indirectly related." Thus, suppose a union demands and secures a
generous wage increase by getting the employers' agreement to a price
schedule and to the union's role as the enforcement mechanism for the
price-fixing. Is price-fixing in that context less directly related to the
employees' legitimate interest in more pay and more stable employment
than the marketing hour restriction viewed essentially as a means of
protecting independents and their employees against the competitive
pressure of self-service operations? Mr. Justice Goldberg said "yes" to
that question, but not even his embattled resourcefulness supplied a
single reason. If there is an acceptable basis for distinguishing the two
situations, it does not consist of a visible difference in the directness
of the employee interests. It does consist of the fact that, like other
groups, employees are subject to limitations in the methods they may
use in advancing the most benign purposes. One such limitation, however obscure, is embodied in the Sherman Act. Because of that limitation, the operative considerations cannot be solely the directness or
importance of the employees' interests; they must also refigct the impact
of the methods used on competition in the product market.
As indicated in my main paper, there is no clear principle for distinguishing between exempt and non-exempt collective bargaining.
Thus, one could follow Mr. Justice Goldberg if he urged that that con25s8 See text accompanying and immediately following note 133 supra.
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sideration, coupled with the toleration of monoply in the labor market,
would justify a blanket exemption for collective bargaining agreements
provided that they did not involve any pay-offs to union leaders; one
could also follow him if he urged that legislative default also makes it
appropriate for the Supreme Court to create such an exemption. But
he makes no such sweeping claims. Nor does he articulate the genuine
difficulties that are inescapable in any judicial effort to accommodate
antitrust and labor policies rather than wholly subordinating one
policy to the other. Instead of a frank recognition of such difficulties,
he offers us what is essentially a new word game based on substituting
"mandatory items of bargaining" for the Sherman Act.
Mr. Justice White's opinion in Jewel Tea, as distinguished from Pennington, has, at least, the virtue of acknowledging that the Court must
somehow balance the conflicting objectives of our national policies. His
balancing test is, of course, easier to state than to apply, a difficulty that
is no novelty, especially in the antitrust or the labor field. Nevertheless, the deep uncertainties that remain, although no occasion for
cheers, may serve to restrain the anti-competitive potential of collective
bargaining while permitting it a large field in which constructively to
advance labor's interests. Furthermore, the opinions of Mr. Justice
White and Mr. Justice Douglas, read together, have supplied one important and desirable clarification; for they show that a majority of the
Court rejects the formalistic distinction between parallel collective bargains with individual employers and bargains by employer groups-a
distinction that disfigured Allen Bradley.
Apart from that clarification, the opinions in Pennington and Jewel
.Tea are disappointing for reasons that are quite independent of the
immediate results. Those opinions have failed to shed much light on a
dark corner of the law. They have failed also to exhibit fruitful internal communication or even a serious effort by the members of the
Court to state dearly and to grapple with the problems raised by the
competing approaches of their colleagues and by the precedents. The
failures registered in the opinions may constitute a form of serendipity
if they encourage Congress to discharge its responsibility for accommodating central and conflicting elements of our national policy. Although
there will be acute disagreement as to the content of the appropriate
adjustment, there will, I believe, be a substantial consensus that Congress should attempt to draw clearer lines and that its continued abdication will confront the Court with intractable problems.

